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Lower majority causes few upheavals



It is five years since the age of majority was reduced from 21 to 18. At the time of the change, many parents feared the worst.

But a poll by the German Youth Institute in Munich shows that the conflict between the generations is not as great as is generally assumed and that most parental worries dating from the change have not been realised.

The study was commissioned by the Bonn Family Affairs Ministry to establish what experience juveniles and parents have had with the new Act.

Of the 500 young people interviewed (the money allocated did not permit any wider ranging polls) 78 per cent of those between 17 and 21 still lived with their parents.

Though one in two contemplated moving out, only 6 per cent wanted to "do so at any cost when the next opportunity presents itself" because they could not stand life in the parental home.

Most, sociologist Richard Rathgeber concluded in the 200-page study, stay at home because they feel happy there and because they get along well with their parents.

Initial fears that 18-year-olds could reject parental suggestions in choosing their future occupations out of rebelliousness have not been confirmed.

Spitefulness or indeed the much vaunted conflict between the generations is much less frequent than generally assumed.

"A vast majority likes to receive parental advice when it comes to important decisions," says Herr Rathgeber.

But parents must be truly counselling and not use their authority or try to talk their children into something.

Of those polled, 83 per cent said: "I'm quite prepared to take advice from my parents but I want to decide whether to accept or reject it."

Only one in 10 insisted on personal independence.

Another fear in connection with the Age of Majority Act has also failed to materialise: The young adults did not "opt out." Just under 96 per cent said that they would complete whatever training they started.

Only 1.5 per cent dreamed of opting out, saying: "I just want to do nothing at all for a while."

In the age group between 18 and 21, Herr Rathgeber sums up, they only want to complete their occupational training.

During training, 86 per cent of the girls and 78 per cent of the boys depended on their parents — mostly for longer than a year.

Not only *gymnasium* students (secondary school leading to university enrolment) but apprentices also were financially dependent on their parents.

The study concludes: "Apprentice wages are inadequate to allow the young people to stand on their own feet in 75 per cent of the cases."

Where youngsters live in the parental home, it has become obvious that more and more parents are prepared to tolerate their being out at night and dating.

"Curfews" have dropped from 40 to just under 10 per cent. Even so, one in three 18-year-olds still has to be home at a certain hour. But this applies mostly to girls.

It speaks in favour of the Act, the authors of the study say, that one-third of the young people interviewed consider it socially necessary.

Especially in cases where parents interfere in the private sphere of young adults majority at 18 buttresses their self confidence.

They can make their own decisions, be it at school or on the job, regardless of the parents' incomes.

"The positive effect lies in the fact that the young adults, their self confidence strengthened, learn how to cope with life."

The view that these immature adults would be overtaxed has not been confirmed, the authors say.


Though young people do opt out on occasion, this has nothing to do with the Age of Majority Act.

"The only negative point to have emerged from the study is the effect of the Act on the public education system." The young adult who is completing his training in an institution must forgo the rights he has only just gained.

Once discharged from the institution, he mostly finds himself without money, work and housing.

All in all, the law "simply enacted what had become a reality in our society anyway." *dpa*

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 12 March 1980)



(Cartoon: Tomaschoff / Süddeutsche Zeitung)

Fear keeps children silent, say researchers

Almost half of Germany's young people are afraid to speak their minds for fear of the consequences.

This is the of a study by the Munich Institute for Youth, Market and Opinion Research and commissioned by the German Shell Company last year.

A total of 1,235 people aged between 17 and 29 and living in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin were interviewed.

Though 54 per cent said they were convinved of the usefulness of freedom of opinion, 43 per cent said: "I don't think it wise to say what one thinks, be it at school or on the job, due to the disadvantages this can bring."

Compared with a similar Shell study in 1973, the young people last year tended to be more conservative or resigned.

Sociologist Detlef Riemer of Coburg, author of the study, said that the "frequent criticism of the system" that marked the 1973 polls was now no longer pronounced and that this was a disquieting fact.

Every other interviewe is afraid now that a frank answer will "rub somebody the wrong way."

As a result, Herr Riemer fears that half of our young generation is well on its way to becoming "yes men". In fact, the potential leadership group, consisting of university students and high-school graduates, is perhaps even more resigned in its attitude than the rest.

At the top of the young people's expectations for their future life ranks personal freedom (85 per cent) followed by a satisfying career (80 per cent) and free choice of a job (67 per cent).

The most important elements in planning were to have a family (65 per cent), social recognition (50 per cent) and a good career (40 per cent).

Growing environment consciousness is borne out by the fact that this is seen as particularly important by 64 per cent (70 per cent among the potential leadership group).

Though striving for professional performance has not changed since 1973, needs have diminished.

In 1973, 67 per cent wanted to be economically better off than their parents. This diminished to 49 per cent in 1979. On the other hand, the number of those who want to maintain their parents' standard of living rose from 29 to 45 per cent.

Six per cent were put off by "their parents' striving for profit" and were well on their way to embracing an "anti-consumerism ideology".

Job problems — above all the youth unemployment which was unimportant in 1973 — were particularly pronounced in 1979. One in 20 considers his job in jeopardy.

Eighty three per cent see the trade unions as a pillar of our economic system. The same percentage approves of the right to strike.

The image of the entrepreneur improved since 1973; 90 per cent saw him as profit oriented, 78 per cent as energetic and 61 per cent as authoritarian, 25 socially responsible and 23 per cent as honest. *rtr*

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 March 1980)

New school to foster talent

A special school for Germany's talented children will be opened shortly by the *Christliches Jugenddorfwerk* (Christian youth village organisation), at Göppingen, Baden-Württemberg.

So far this body has provided more than 100 educational institutions to fill gaps in the German educational system.

Germany's super-IQ children will no longer have to sit through their lessons bored to tears and apathetic.

To start with, the organisation will establish a fifth grade at its Brunswick school to cater exclusively to these children. Two additional classes are to follow at annual intervals.

Bodo Volkmann, a mathematics professor at the Technical University of Stuttgart and president of the organisation (he began it) expects protests from German education experts. But this does not worry him.

"We don't consider it undemocratic to provide different facilities for differing degrees of talent," says Professor Volkmann.

Children attending the new school must have an IQ of at least 140 (Albert Einstein's IQ was 172 while the national average ranges between 90 and 109).

The minds of these children are constantly questioning and this goes right back to infancy: They start talking before the age of two, and by the time they are six to eight their vocabulary equals that of an educated adult. Conspicuously, they constantly ask questions.

The new school intends to accept of these super-talented children year. They will be carefully screened for intellectual and character suitability. The selection board is particularly interested in personality compatibility to prevent the emergence of elite consciousness.

The children will be taught to regard their talent as "an obligation to society".

Subjects and curriculum have not been fixed but it is certain that children will be taught four languages apart from religion, sport, art and music.

In addition, professors of the Brunswick Technical University and artists will be on hand to provide instruction in favourite subjects.

The Brunswick project is entirely new territory for this country. Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union have had such school for some time.

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 14 March 1980)

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A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

Schmidt, Thatcher probe EEC cash options

Britain seems readier to compromise and agree to a package deal to offset what the Common Market is due to cost Whitehall this year, Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt feels after talks with Mrs Thatcher at Chequers. Something must certainly be done about the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy, which threatens to bankrupt not only Britain but the European Community as a whole.

There is little likelihood of another Waterloo at which the British and the Germans join forces against the French, although one could well imagine Helmut Schmidt in the role of Blücher, the Prussian general.

But Herr Schmidt is most unlikely to feel any inclination to follow in Blücher's footsteps and rush to Mrs Thatcher's assistance in her battle with M. Giscard d'Estaing.

The Chancellor's fireside chat with Mrs Thatcher at Chequers was bound to be a chilly affair, especially as cancellation of the Common Market summit put paid to any sense of urgency.

Too much was expected of his meeting with the British Prime Minister in any case. Herr Schmidt sees eye to eye with M. Giscard d'Estaing too much these days to seriously consider a special relationship with Britain and America.

In ties between Britain, France and Germany, the three major Common Market countries, Britain has always played a minor role.

Once it was a member of the EEC Britain had hoped to loosen the close ties between France and Germany, but these hopes have never really been fulfilled.

Britain was simply too late in joining the Common Market, and this largely accounts for its current problems. Had it been in on the venture from the outset the EEC would doubtless have taken a different shape.

There would certainly have been no such thing as the Common Agricultural Policy in its present form.

General de Gaulle later blackballed the British not only because in reckoned they were America's henchmen in Europe but also because he was afraid they would never accept the EEC's farm policy.

He had found it difficult enough to persuade Bonn to agree to the CAP, succeeding only by threatening to collapse the Community.

Had they only been founder-members of the EEC the British would probably not now be in the sorry state of having to beg for alms as the third-poorest of the Nine.

Like the Germans they could have exploited the opportunities presented by an EEC home market and customs union to step up exports of industrial goods to foot the growing Common Market farm bill.

But when Britain finally joined the Six in 1973 it was too late. Markets had, for the most part, been carved up and Britain was no longer the competitive major industrial nation it had once been.

It was, in any case, the largest food importer among the none and obliged to buy its food where it sold its industrial goods, mostly outside the EEC.

This meant that Whitehall had to pay extremely high levies on agricultural imports from non-EEC countries, with the result that Britain has suddenly emerged as the paymaster of Europe.

Britain does not have only itself to blame. It is up against it, and by the terms of its accession treaty is entitled to assistance from other EEC countries.

Not even the French deny that Britain needs a helping hand. Unlike Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist leader, who has already suggested that Britain be relegated to the status of an associate EEC member, M. Giscard d'Estaing cannot be interested in a crisis that would jeopardise the Community's survival.

He is keen to establish himself in Africa and the Middle East as an EEC leader independent of the United States, and for this purpose he needs to retain a largely intact Common Market.

As far as he is concerned the dispute with Whitehall is merely horse-trading, and that in an election year!

The French President is prepared to allow Britain some discount on its high membership dues but in return Britain must reduce the price of North Sea oil, increase the price of Canterbury lamb and continue to allow French trawlers to fish in British waters.

Mrs Thatcher has so far shown no inclination to consider a package deal of this kind. Her mistake, if such it it, has been not to regard the present crisis as one of the many with which the EEC has come to terms.

Instead she insists on coming to the heart of the matter. It is not merely a matter of whether or not Britain can afford to pay the price of membership; she has called the EEC's entire agricultural policy into question.

CAP indeed accounts for the lion's share of the Common Market's budget. Britain's contribution towards the EEC budget is a minor matter, or certainly will be if the Nine continue to meet the farmers' demands.

If the cost of the farm budget continues to increase at its present rate the EEC will be bankrupt either this year or, at the latest, next year. The Nine as a whole can no longer afford to pay the price.

Helmut Schmidt may agree with Mrs Thatcher that financing EEC farm surpluses is absurd, but he is unable to help her.

She too must realise that Common Market agricultural policies cannot be set right over night. Their solution will probably take the form of a compromise such as a higher payout by the EEC social and regional funds.

As the main contributor to these funds the Chancellor is understandably in favour of thrift, and the role of mediator was to have been played by Italian Premier Francesco Cossiga.

Mrs Thatcher has promised British taxpayers to arrive at a swift solution to the burden imposed by EEC levies, so she can but hope that the other sick man of Europe, Italy, regains his form and succeeds in lending the promised hand. *Dieter Schröder*

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 March 1980)



British Premier Margaret Thatcher welcoming Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to Britain for talks at Chequers. Foreign Ministers Lord Carrington and Hans-Dietrich Genscher are seen behind their respective leaders, who discussed world affairs in general and Britain's EEC payments problem in particular. (Photos: dpa)

IN THIS ISSUE



Apel meets Hosoda

Bonn Defence Minister Hans Apel began his two-day visit to Japan by conferring with Japanese Defence Minister Kichizo Hosoda in Tokyo. In reviewing international affairs they dealt especially with the possibility of stepping up defence expenditure.

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Changes in the role of Berlin as a barometer of detente

For years we have been told that Berlin is a touchstone of detente and developments in and around the city are a pointer to the current state of East-West ties.

Berlin, the argument runs, is like a barometer on which a rise or fall in pressure can be read off.

For some time, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there has been an international crisis that could well gain in intensity.

Yet there has been no change in the situation in and around Berlin as laid down in the 1971 Four-Power agreement. Ties between the two German states have also, superficially at least, yet to be affected by the trend in world affairs.

So is it, perhaps, no longer true to say that Berlin is a test case of detente?

First, the view on which this concept was based was, if not egocentric, then at least Eurocentric. Detente was viewed mainly as a European phenomenon, from which it logically followed that relations on the border between East and West in Europe were a yardstick of world affairs.

By this token the Cold War appeared to have been an exclusively European affair: a clash between the great powers on European territory.

The Gaullist era in France, which was particularly given to this Eurocentric view, evidently made a greater mark on *the general view of world affairs than was commonly assumed to be the case.*

Prior to the Gaullist era the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany was known to have been fostered by the Soviet challenge the Berlin blockade unquestionably represented.

But the subsequent rearmament of Germany, for instance, was known to have been a result of the shock waves emitted by the Korean War in the early 50s.

So the Cold War was by no means an exclusively European phenomenon, it was commonly agreed.

Mistaken identification of peace and quiet in Berlin with peace and quiet in world affairs in general was a complete misunderstanding of Soviet interests.

Bonn's new Ostpolitik, pursued by Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister and Chancellor, did not, for that matter, take place in a vacuum in world affairs.

It was a response to an improvement in relations between the great powers. It entailed satisfying the Soviet desire for recognition of the status quo in Europe in return for an improvement in and around Berlin and in ties between the two German states.

The Soviet Union agreed to pay the price because the deal legalised its position in Central Europe without foreclosing on Soviet diplomatic options for the future.

Temporary peace and quiet in Central Europe, where unilateral moves always entailed a substantial risk, provided them with an opportunity of paying political and military attention to other parts of the world.

In other words, the Federal Republic was not alone in gaining greater leeway as a result of the relaxation of tension in Central Europe, a fact Bonn never tired of emphasising; the Soviet Union also benefited from greater leeway.

Thus it may well be in the Soviet interest to maintain the situation in Berlin and the state of ties between the two German states, especially when Moscow is steering a confrontation course elsewhere.

The Soviet Union has always been quick to switch theatres in its conduct of foreign affairs. It has always been ready to reconcile tension in one part of the world with detente in another — always providing it was in the Soviet interest to do so.

Regardless of the Vietnam war between the United States and a Soviet ally the Kremlin saw fit to conclude the first Salt agreement with President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger.

While seeming to promote detente in Europe by means of the Helsinki conference in the interest of which the United States was accepted as a party to European security, the Kremlin had no compunction in exploiting each and every sign of US weakness in other parts of the world.

Even before Afghanistan this interplay of tension and detente had made the prospects of ratification of Salt 2 by the US Senate steadily more doubtful.

The Salt debate brought to light an extremely interesting fact as far as Moscow was concerned. While US opinion felt increasingly challenged and insecure as a result of the Soviet conduct of world affairs, Europe was evidently interested in keeping up detente at all costs.

Thus the Europeans brought pressure to bear on the US Senate to ratify Salt 2 whatever happened.

The Soviet Union has taken good care to bear this fact in mind in its handling of the Afghanistan crisis to date. It has left the situation in and around Berlin and in Central Europe unchanged for the time being because otherwise Europe and the United States would close ranks.

It is in the Soviet interest to ensure that the US intention of handling the crisis brought about by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan grows increasingly at odds with the European intention of holding to detente at all costs.

Moscow openly claims that detente cannot be reconciled with participation in what it dubs the US policy of adventurism.

Bonn, as its entire approach to the Afghanistan crisis has shown, early realised the complexity of the situation and chose neither to accept the one view nor to reject the other.

The West German government has sought to skirt the issue by showing itself on the one hand to be a reliably partner of the United States while on the other trying to create the impression that it was using its influence on the United States to urge restraint on Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union was to continue to feel that the Bonn government appreciated Moscow's interests even though, in its own security interest, it might not, in the final analysis, have any choice but to side with the United States.

This was, and continues to be, an extremely dangerous tight-rope walk. It has resulted in a slight gap openi... between Bonn and Washington as... cond instalment in the price Bon... had to pay for its treaties with the... bloc and continued Soviet good co... in their connection.

This tight-rope act is not only... mely difficult to keep up; it wil... increasingly difficult as the Afgha... crisis assumes permanent proportio...

The Soviet Union has show... interest in the European propos... neutralisation of Afghanistan in co... nation with a Soviet troop pull-out.

Indeed, Moscow regards the p... as part of the intervention th... made Soviet military presence in Af... nistan indispensable.

The Soviet troops seem set to... put, which relegates to minor im... tance the questions what might... motivated the Soviet invasion and... might this motive be satisfied with... the Soviet occupation assuming pe... nent proportions.

The actual changes thus come to... fore. The main considerations are... the strategic options the Soviet Un... has gained in the Middle East as a... of the occupation of Afghanistan a... the potential threat they represent.

Bonn is at least as keenly interes... in stability in the Middle East as Wa... ington is.

So Bonn will be increasingly obli... to accord priority to the interest... shares with the United States, especi... in the event of a crisis that would se... to threaten Germany too in the lo... term, albeit only indirectly.

Then it will be clear whether Mosco... intended its policy of coming to term... with Bonn as a mere means of keepi... the Federal Republic under control.

The Kremlin is already trying to im... press on Bonn that Moscow, and Mos... cow alone, is responsible for maintaini... peace and quiet in and around Be... (which is simply not true).

(Der Tagesspiegel, 23 March 19...)

EEC gains ground in Africa

Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa remains strictly limited despite the troops and economic advisers they have stationed around the continent.

There are roughly 41,000 East bloc troops in Africa. Two Soviet generals were recently killed in action in Eritrea and flown home to Moscow.

A further 37,000 technicians and engineers from the socialist countries are stationed in 23 African states, according to another report.

News items such as these are relayed with increasing frequency and deserve attention inasmuch as Africa is Europe's next-door neighbour as a continent.

By virtue of jet-propelled air travel Africa is nowadays only a few hours away from Western Europe, which has a vital interest in ties with its neighbour to the south.

So it is hardly surprising that the European Community and Nato are paying greater attention to Africa.

If the Soviet Union were to gain a permanent foothold in Africa it could outflank Europe militarily from the south and cut it off economically from its life's blood: raw materials in general and oil in particular.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) commissioned a newly-published report on The Role of Africa in European Security Policy.

The WEU, a defence pact to which all EEC countries except Ireland and Denmark belong, sees the Lomé convention as the key to safeguarding European interests in the 58 Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries that signed the Lomé pact with the EEC Nine.

The aim must be to lend Africa an economic and financial helping hand in establishing functioning economies, creating prosperity and ensuring domestic stability.

Conflict and rivalry between African states and tribes must be settled as a crucial prerequisite ensuring that the Soviet Union has no pretext for maintaining a full-scale military and political presence in Africa.

Nearly 80,000 communist troops and economic advisers are already based in Africa. In Libya a Soviet general is in charge of operations designed to foster unrest systematically in Central Africa.

Sudan, a country 10 times the size of the Federal Republic and Bonn's foremost development aid partner in Africa, is talking in terms of a Soviet invasion in connection with the war between Marxist Ethiopia and the Eritrean Liberation Front.

Sudan, already a bitterly poor country, has nearly half a million refugees from Eritrea. Yet President Numeiri succeeded in the early 70s in putting paid to Soviet infiltration.

Sudan's case is typical of various attempts to establish communist influence in Africa. Guinea is another instance.

When Guinea gained independence i... the late 50s it parted company with t... colonial mother country, France, an... sought Soviet friendship.

President Sekou Touré was a we... known Soviet fellow-traveller in We... Africa. Yet two years ago he slow... began to steer a new course.


In Conakry, the capital of Guinea, ... Sekou Touré told Claude Cheysson, th... French EEC commissioner with respo... sibility for development aid, that Lo... 2 must definitely include a clause gu... ranteeing the safety of European priv... investment in the ACP countries.

Africa, he said, needed private inve... ment by Western Europe in order t... cary out its economic development.

The Lomé convention has alre... taken a step in this direction with t... blessing of Guinea's M. Sekou Touré.

Continued on page 6

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■ HOME AFFAIRS

Top Green Party man from the right wing

August Haussleiter has been elected to the executive board of the Greens, the environmentalist party.

The choice was made at the national congress of the party in Saarbrücken.

Haussleiter is an old acquaintance from many political kitchens in which he has cooked up all kinds of stews, following hastily devised recipes. Unfortunately, the public has found his concoctions unpalatable.

He left the CSU after a fierce dispute, and found as few takers for his German Community as he did for his National Rally of his Action Community of Independent Germans.

Now, he finds himself at the top of the Greens, although they have vowed to exercise grassroots demoracy and abide by a collective leadership. Though Herr Haussleiter tried to hide his triumph, there was no overlooking it at the congress.

Rarely has a Green congress been as consistent and as contradictory. Consistent because Haussleiter's chaotic political life symbolises the chaos that prevails among the Greens and contradictory because his election seems like a bit of sleight of hand and wrong labelling. A man who, notwithstanding escapades, has always been on the right is suddenly made the figurehead of a group that began as an ecological movement and has now become a leftist-socialist protest party.

This being so, it is hard no to think of tactical ruses intended to keep the genuine ecologists in line, i. e. the followers of Herbert Gruhl and Baldur Springmann, whose objective is to preserve ecological aims regardless of left or right. Or was it all just a coincidence?

The tumultous Saarbrücken congress with all its conflicts makes the latter rather likely.

It was chaos, complete with storming of the rostrum and speakers who refused to yield the microphone and scores of protests and procedural debates amid group dancing and a screaming urban group of environmentalists. The 800 delegates' dress ranged from the typical rocker outfit all the way to stiff middle class suit and tie.

Amid all this, there were playing children, and rucksacks and sleeping bags piled up in the corners.

The whole thing appeared as casual as many Greens wanted it so that their programme of starting from scratch could gain credibility.

But in retrospect it all seems dreamlike.

Passages proposed by the Programme Commission on Foreign and Peace Policy, originally showing a certain restraint towards the established parties and yet clearly presenting an alternative were changed in favour of strict neutrality.

They range from unilateral disarmament via the abolishment of the military blocs all the way to the disbandment of the Bundeswehr.

The former CDU MP Herbert Gruhl, who was the author of the original programme, found himself virtually without following when only a couple of hands were raised to vote with him for the rejection of the new proposals.

Then came the debate where the Greens could really have proved that their political culture is as unimpeachable as they have always claimed. Their policy is to be one without violence and protective of the minorities.

There is, for instance, our abortion legislation where two aims of the Greens clash. On the one hand, they want full self-determination for women, i. e. the abolishment of all abortion legislation, and, on the other, they want to protect human life.

It soon turned out that a large minority — if not the majority — was determined to bring about free abortion for all. The compromise finally adopted would not have been possible had the spectre of a split not arisen.

But it is a poor compromise, essentially saying that abortion cannot be a matter of legal persecution. If words still have any meaning at all, this can only boil down to free abortion.

Nobody expected the Greens to resolve a conflict that has so long troubled the established parties.

But the crude dogmatism of the debate was irritating.

The line of argument that essentially boiled down to the contention that nascent life is not all that worthy of protection after all compared with the self-determination of women was embarrassing and deeply depressing.

It was also depressing, to see young woman delegates cry when the compromise motion was passed because they had demanded the total abolition of the legislation.

No matter how understandable their tears, they made it amply clear that they had lost the ability to respect the views of others.

The final clash came when the passages dealing with economic and social affairs were imbued with leftist ideas and garnished with demands of which Gruhl and some others said that they reflected the materialistic ideas of the established parties.

And when they finally called for a breakup of mammoth concerns into small units that would be run democratically and the introduction of the 35-hour week on 49-hour pay, the programme was turned inside out and Gruhl made it clear that he could no longer go along.

It would be an inadequate explanation to say that all this has been engineered by the Communist groups who would like to float in the wake of the Greens. They alone could not have achieved such majorities. But majorities were summoned by osmosis, so to speak, from the leftist groups and the broad mass of young delegates who predominated in Saarbrücken — unlike in previous meetings, where many delegates were middle-aged or older people. A change has obviously taken place at grassroots level.

Most of these young people don't differentiate at all between Helmut Schmidt and Franz Josef Strauss. And when told that they might only be helping Strauss come to power they seriously argue that the big danger lies with Schmidt, the proponent of nuclear energy.

Because of such extreme naivety it is unlikely that anybody will be able to sway them from this position.

The argument that Gruhl's rejection of their thesis could cost them the fa-

Continued on page 4

Environmentalist known for rhetorical speeches

August Haussleiter

The rhetoric talent of August Haussleiter, 75, is considerable. He has always captured audiences with unbridled speeches and brutal slogans.

In 1966, Haussleiter, once a member of the CSU and now a member of the executive board of the Greens (environmentalists) accused the then Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, of being "stuck in puberty".

He also called Franz Josef Strauss a lay strategist dreaming of an authoritarian state along the lines of dictator Salazar's Portugal. About himself he said that he was a "staunch enemy of the Western powers."

For decades, Haussleiter was regarded one of the most brilliant nonconformists of the right.

He was one of the founders of the CSU and was elected that party's deputy chairman in 1948. But only a year later he found himself at loggerheads with the party.

Since then, he has been an untiring founder of parties and action groups on the extreme periphery of the right wing and in the no-man's-land of special political groups.

The son of a Nuremberg clergyman, he was a protagonist of Gustav Stresemann's liberal-conservative policy during the Weimar era. As editor of *Fränkischer Kurier*, he opposed the Nazis and even tackled the powerful Gauleiter Julius Streicher.

His book *An der mittleren Ostfront* (on the central East front) in which he describes his war experience earned him the accusation of defeatism during the Nazi era. Paradoxically, after the war he was put on trial for glorifying militarism.

Since 1953 he has been trying to use his umbrella Organisation for National Rallying and the German Community as a springboard to the Bundestag. In vain.

In 1965 he joined the Action Community of Independent Germans (AUD) which dubs itself the "German opposition par excellence".

It was easy for the Franconian nonconformist to take the step from the AUD to the Greens, having for some time sought a tie with "anti-authoritarian" leftist groups. *Franz Wauschkuhn*

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 26 March 1980)

Herbert Gruhl

(Photos: Sven Simon)

Setback not the end of the road

DIE WELT

Those who watched Herbert Gruhl on TV as he announced that he would not run for the executive board of the Greens could easily have had the impression that he was beaten man.

But that would be underestimating Herbert Gruhl. After all, the former CDU politician and Bundestag member, whom many considered the embodiment of a new type of middle-class politician, could hardly have been surprised at the outcome.

Everything, from the dispropriation of mammoth corporations via the demand for unilateral Western disarmament all the way to the call for a 35-hour week at 40-hour pay, has been part of previous party demands.

Gruhl knew very well that all this had nothing to do with ecology and that it was indeed the opposite of it because it would require strong economic growth to be implemented.

At that time he beseeched the Greens to write to him along these lines. He hoped that a tide of letters from kindred spirits would help him prevail.

This was naturally illusory. Modern democracy is subject to the dictatorship of microphones and prefabricated slogans, to defamation and personal insults. In short, it is subject to different laws.

But Gruhl has not yet given up. His renunciation of a seat on the executive board and his having distanced himself from a part of the programme is probably his last attempt to prevent the Greens from swinging towards Marxism.

Gruhl, a farmer's son, is much more important to those likely to vote Green than the Saarbrücken congress tried to make believe.

His book *Ein Planet wird geplündert* (plunder of planet) which was published in 1975 was for many people the first encounter with a departure from civilization's wrong ways.

It would be wrong to believe that a man of letters like Gruhl is too unrealistic to stand his ground in the catch-as-catch-can turmoil of a new party.

Hundreds of people told him in 1978, when he left the CDU, that exactly this would happen. He is still trying to prove them wrong. *Joachim Neander*

(Die Welt, 25 March 1980)

■ THE LAW

New definition sought on vexed question of 'lockouts'

Lockouts are one option open to employers when unions hold strikes, especially selective strikes in individual areas or at individual firms designed to cut strike fund costs. The employers may then retaliate by a lockout in factories that are not on strike. So far only Hesse has sought to regulate the legality and constitutionality of at lockout. Article 9 of the 1 December 1946 Hesse constitution states: "The right to strike is recognised. Lockouts are illegal." The Federal Labour Court, on the other hand, ruled in 1971 that subject to relativity both strikes by employees and lockouts by employers were permissible. The Kassel court is now in session on an appeal aimed at reversing this decision.

For decades law students were taught, and case law worked on the assumption, that strikes and lockouts were equally legitimate forms of industrial dispute, both covered by constitutional guarantees of freedom of association.

Nowadays, however, employers occasionally resort to mass lockouts that are a far cry from individual disputes of old, and the trade unions are not amused.

The unions dispute the validity of the time-honoured assumption and have reacted to mass lockouts by carpet litigation, as it were, bombarding the employers with labour tribunal proceedings.

Their aim is to persuade the courts to rule lockouts constitutionally illegal, or so they claim. In fact they cannot genuinely expect the Federal Labour Court to *completely revise its past viewpoint and declare lockouts illegal.*

They probably hope to arrive at a binding court ruling on the nature and extent of lockouts as a valid means of conducting industrial disputes.

The unions' bid to get the high court to make a clear definition of when a lockout is legal was prompted by the countrywide lockout in the newspaper industry in the wake of the 1978 strike by printworkers.

At the hearing before the Federal Labour Court in Kassel the two sides trundled out time-honoured arguments, so the bench is unlikely to have learnt anything new from what counsel for the employers and the trade unions had to say.

The only striking feature of their arguments was the degree to which both sides chose to fight in minor theatres, arguing their cases in terms of Christian social teachings, alleged common law and even public opinion.

Statute and case law evidently did not prove very helpful in their search for arguments to support their respective cases.

This is hardly surprising. Where industrial disputes are concerned the law has kept very much to itself, leaving almost everything to be decided by the two sides of industry on their own.

Gerhard Müller, chief justice of the Federal Labour Court, put it in much more drastic terms in Kassel. Bonn, he said, had left the courts sadly in the lurch.

No-one is denying the Bundestag's right to give legal definition to methods of industrial dispute, limiting them if need be to prevent misuse.

This parliamentary right is undisputed providing the Bundestag does not interfere in the freedom of unions and employers to negotiate wage agreements.

Indeed, all MPs must definitely do is observe strict neutrality, taking good care to ensure that neither side in an industrial dispute is put to either advantage or disadvantage.

The Bundestag may soon be left with not much choice but to legislate on this issue, better late than never, as it were. Chief Justice Müller indicated at the hearing that the Grand Senate division of the Federal Labour Court might be forced to take action.

This would in all probability mean that the court would insist on the Bundestag making a ruling on the legal definition and status of the lockout.

This would certainly be the most satisfactory solution. All Labour Court judges are sooner or later overtaxed when called on to give rulings on issues where there are next to no legal guidelines on which to base a judgment.

Where lockouts, for instance, are concerned tribunals can base their judgments solely on antiquated case law that at least in part can no longer be appropriate now methods of industrial dispute have changed.

There are possibilities of legislating a solution to the lockout problem without banning lockouts altogether (a ban would probably not stand up if employers were to appeal to the Constitutional Court).

The Bundestag could, for instance, rule that strikes and lockouts may only serve the purpose of getting the two sides back round the negotiating table.

Logically a countrywide lockout would then be illegal, since its aim would clearly be to reduce the trade unions to penury. The same would be true of selective strikes aimed at ruining one or more companies.

Parliament could also rule that a lockout does not automatically [...] dismissal. During a lockout [...] status would merely be shelved [...] were.

As a rule it is already consider[ed sus]pended rather than ended, but the exceptions in which dismissal [...] are deemed to have been served.

Bonn could also deal in greater [...] with the principle of relativity, [...] forms the basis of many rulings [...] bour tribunals.

This would then prevent the [...] from countering moves by the [...] with methods out of all relation [...] original mode of dispute.

Employers would, for instance [...] prohibited by law from imposi[ng a] countrywide lockout in answer to a [...]tial strike by the unions.

Legal uncertainty in respect of [lock]outs is attributable, in the final [...] to the Parliamentary Council that [...]ed and endorsed Basic Law in the [...] 40s.

If the men and women who dra[fted] the 1949 Bonn constitution had [...] mentioned strikes and lockouts by n[...] declaring both to enjoy constitu[tional] guarantees as valid modes of indu[strial] dispute, the courts would not now [...] to rule on whether the lockout is [gua]ranteed by the constitutional freedom [of] association or not.

But the minutes show that the [Par]liamentary Council began to discuss [the] problem of lockouts but later dropp[ed] the issue.

Yet a simple Act of Parliament pa[ssed] by the Bundestag would be sufficient [to] settle the issue. There is no need for [an] amendment to Basic Law.

Rainer Klos

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 March 19[80])

Top Green man

Continued from page 3

vour of the middle class which alone can help them take the 5 per cent election hurdle leaves them as unimpressed as Springmann's appeal to stick to their ecological last.

Of course, they still want Gruhl and Springmann among their ranks, but if a split should prove impossible to avert they are prepared to accept it.

These young people are left cold by the fact that their dogmatism could harm their ecological cause. What matters is only the universe they have just devised on paper.

They are determined to embark on their for a sunny state, a crusade against our egotistical, materialistic and affluent society, come what may.

It seems as if the Greens wrote their own obituary in Saarbrücken.

Carl-Christian Kaiser

(Die Zeit, 28 March 1980)

Criminal files are to be thrown open

People in West Germany are now legally entitled to apply to the Bundeskriminalamt for details of the records on them in a current total of 31 police files.

Details of this right are included in regulations on Bundeskriminalamt files newly drafted by the Bonn Interior Ministry.

"The police need to be able to rely on the confidence of the general public in their work," says Andreas von Schoeler, parliamentary under-secretary at the Ministry of the Interior.

"Mistrust can only be reduced by the greatest possible degree of transparency."

Applications for photostats or a computer printout of one's files may be submitted in writing to the Bundeskriminalamt in Wiesbaden. As yet they are handled free of charge.

The Länder, or Federal states, supply most of the facts on file, and the new regulations, which are scheduled to come into force this summer, were discussed with them on 25 March.

Herr von Schoeler was not expecting fundamental differences of opinion to arise at the talks between Bonn and the Länder, and as for the Bundeskriminalamt, its head, Horst Herold, had agreed to the regulations "right down to the last detail."

This is what they envisage:—

• *How files are set up:* In the past files have usually been set up as a result of decisions by working parties of the Standing Conference of Federal and State Interior Ministers.

The obvious drawback of this procedure is that such committees and their findings, recommendations and decisions are not subject to parliamentary control.

In future the head of the Bundeskriminalamt will issue a decree in conjunction with the Interior Ministers in Bonn and the Länder.

This published declaration of intent will include the legal justification, the purpose of the file, the category of people on whom files are to be kept, the kind of records to be kept and regulations governing access to information on file and when records may be wholly or partially scrapped.

The head of the Bundeskriminalamt will also stipulate from the start whether information is to be supplied to applicants, and if it is, how, when and subject to what conditions.

• *How information is to be divulged:* "In the past information was not, as a rule, divulged," says Herr von Schoeler. "In future it will, as a rule, be divulged, expect for a limited number of cases."

Kurt Fritz, the Ministry official responsible for matters concerning the Bundeskriminalamt, reckons about 80 per cent of files will definitely be available for enquiries.

"In the espionage sector, of course, information will have to be supplied more sparingly," he adds.

Suppliers of information, as a rule the state police authorities, will, however, be able to stipulate that certain items of information may not be divulged to the individual.

If there turns out to be a flood of enquiries addressed to the Bundeskriminalamt extra staff will be hired. "The FBI has an enquiry office of its own," [...] Bonn notes.

• *Statutory obligation to inform the individual:* In certain circumstances [the] Bundeskriminalamt is under legal o[bli]gation to inform the individual [...] facts about him are on file.

This applies to people who are [...] the subject of police enquiries the[m]selves and whose data have been [...] file for more than 12 months.

They would, for instance, incl[ude] electricity board clients whose data w[ere] checked not long ago in the search [for] terrorist hideouts.

If you lose your passport you will [...] be filed and later informed of the [...] Many documents reported lost are [in] fact sold to criminals.

• *Access:* Unlimited civil service ac[cess] to other files is to scrapped. Author[ities] who request information from a file [...] by another authority will in future b[e ...] to provide proof of their identity [...] justification, with spot checks b[eing] taken.

• *When records are to be destroyed:* As a rule entries will be scrapped af[ter] 10 years, if not earlier. Exceptions [...] only be allowed in cases such as the [...] of dangerous miscreants, such as sex [of]fenders.

The Bundeskriminalamt has set up [a] department specially to supervise the [de]struction of data. A number of reco[rd] sections have already been scrapped.

Take, for instance, the files on u[rban] guerrillas set up during the search [for] the abductors and assassins of Han[s] Martin Schleyer. Data on 30,000 peo[ple] whose names were included in the [...] cords as part of the terrorist dra[gnet] have now been destroyed.

Horst Zimmermann

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 22 March 19[80])

■ THE EEC

Arguments go on as EMS ends its first year

The European Monetary System, aged one, is in an unusual position. This latest brainchild of European integration has come in for fulsome birthday praise from the politicians who sired it, yet they are far from convinced it will have learnt to walk, let alone run, by the age of two. Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing have already agreed not to sign on the dotted line and finally establish the EMS next March. Even if the European summit had been held on 31 March, the leaders of the Nine were not expected to do more than agree to a further trial period. Herr Schmidt and M. Giscard d'Estaing have no wish to take major political decisions before their respective general elections, and the EMS in its present form does not exactly represent a temptation to go firm. The Common Market may claim to be satisfied with its progress so far and confident of its future, but EEC leaders are well aware of the risks that could lie ahead. Inflation rate disparities between member-countries are on the increase and exchange rate tension could mount to the point at which the EMS could come apart at the seams. This *Frankfurter Rundschau* article outlines how the EMS works and what risks it runs.

It all began with the Snake, so called because member-countries (11 initially) linked their currencies against each other but floated collectively against the ailing dollar and other currencies.

But collective floating, launched in 1972, did not last long. The 1973 oil crisis sent the Snake slithering. Oil price increases imposed a crippling burden.

More especially, the differences in effect they had on the balance of trade and the rate of inflation in member-countries proved a severe strain on the Snake.

Financial transactions, no matter how substantial, failed to succeed in stabilising exchange rates. Britain and Italy were forced to quit the Snake. They were followed by France, Sweden and Norway.

In 1978 Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing went back to the drawing board. The European Monetary System was planned as a "zone of stability" within Europe.

The EMS was to further the cause of European integration and, no doubt, to boost the reputation of the French and West German leaders.


They made fine-sounding statements in plenty, but the EMS's labour pains were greater than their fine words seemed to suggest.

Surprisingly, the EEC's Common Agricultural Market proved an obstacle. The EMS did not get off the ground until the Agriculture Ministers of the Nine reached a compromise on 13 March 1979.

Herr Schmidt sees the EMS as "a fundamental element in a more comprehensive concept aimed at lasting growth and stable prices, a gradual return to full employment and a reduction in regional disparities.

"The EMS will facilitate economic policy convergence within the EEC and give European integration a fillip."

This view came in for strong criticism, especially in the system's early stages. Most critics of fixed exchange rates found it too monetaristic.



True enough, the EMS's promoters framed their objectives in money terms. Harmonisation of monetary policy was to level out differences in economic policy.

It was even to make possible a strengthening of regions where per capita income was still way below the EEC average, this being what the reduction in regional disparities meant.

A Heidelberg pep group, the Social Free-Market Economy Working Party, is a leading member of the EMS rejectionist front. It argues that exchange rate policies cannot bring about convergence in economic and cyclical policies of the countries concerned.

The free trade lobby reckons it is pointless to begin with exchange rates rather than with domestic financial stability, by which the money and cyclical policies of each individual country are meant.

These critics claim flexible exchange rates will continue to be appropriate until such time as countries have come so close together that rates remain stable anyway.

This was indeed a sore point, although it had not altogether been overlooked by the founding fathers of the EMS.

Member-governments were required to give solemn assurances that they would coordinate domestic money measures and fight inflation by all the means at their command.

The summer 1978 EEC summit put it briefly. Closer monetary cooperation could only prove successful "provided member-countries pursued policies leading to greater stability both at home and abroad."

This declaration, however, is as far as they got. It has been left to good will and the staying power of Finance Ministers to ensure that the EMS stands a chance of genuinely emerging as a "community of stability."


What has it achieved in its first year? In technical terms it has worked well. With the aid of computers problems of calculation were kept more or less under control from the start.

The early warning indicator (see chart) led in most instances to market intervention, and when exchange rate divergences proved too great, ECU central rates were amended.

ECU membership and share of currency basket

The ECU, or European Currency Unit, is made up of a basket of currencies, the currencies of the nine member-countries being weighted according to their economic significance.

Country	Percentage stake in ECU	ECU central rates
Germany	33.4	DM2.48
France	19.7	Fr5.86
Holland	10.4	Fl2.75
Belgium	9.6	Fr39.79
Italy	9.4	L1,157.79
Denmark	2.8	Kr7.72
Ireland	1.1	67p
Britain	13.6	–



In September 1979 the deutschemark was revalued by one per cent against the ECU and the other currencies devalued one per cent, while the Danish krone was devalued a further three per cent.

In November the krone was devalued by 4.75 per cent more.

Inflation rates (see chart) indicate that hopes on this score have not been fulfilled. They have not only increased; disparities are growing ever wider.

Oil-based inflation is mainly to blame, not the EMS itself, but the EMS has proved unable to halt the trend even though member-countries have succeeded in harmonising their stability policies in one respect.

Everywhere bank rates have been increased, which is taken as an earnest of member-countries' determination to tackle inflation.

Finance Minister Hans Matthöfer somewhat euphorically concludes in Bonn that "official and private-sector increases in interest rates are due first and foremost to stability policy constraints imposed by the EMS."

Professor Glastetter, a trade union member of the Economic Advisory Council to the Bonn government (a body usually dubbed the "Five Wise Men"), disagrees.

He takes a much more cautious view of whether interest rates geared to stability were necessarily a result of countries taking part in the European Monetary System.

It was "quite possible that most EMS countries would have pursued stability policies even if the system had not been in existence, but at least it promotes such steps more than it prevents them."

The three exchange rate adjustments superficially appeared to run smoothly, but in reality they subjected the EMS to severe strain.

More than DM10bn had to be poured into money markets in intervention to support exchange rates before they were eventually revised.

Countries that devalued wanted to forestall for as long as possible the detrimental effect of exchange rate realignment: inflationary increases in the price of imports.

Inflation has meanwhile proved to be by no means the sole cause of exchange rate trends. The Italian lira is in a fairly sound position in terms of divergence from the ECU central rate even though Italy's inflation rate is highest.

This is reckoned to be due to Italy's substantial foreign trade surplus last year, which in its turn was due to successive devaluations of the lira in the past.

Roughly the same is true of the French franc, whereas the deutschemark has been successively revalued, with the result that German exports are less competitive and Bonn has a current account deficit.

Alexandre Lamfalussy of the Bank for International Settlements is in no doubt, however, that in the long term inflation rates determine the relative strength of currencies.

National monetary policy-makers largely agree too. Approximation of inflation rates, taking the lowest as the target, is considered a fundamental prerequisite for the EMS's survival.

This is the quarter from which the system continues to be in the most serious danger. The stronger dollar will soon make its presence felt in import bills as a whole, especially oil bills, pushing prices even further up.

Inflation rates and percentage change from ECU central rate

Country	Percentage inflation 1979 average	Jan 1980 over Jan 1979	Percentage change from ECU central rate*
Germany	4.1	5.0	–27
France	10.8	12.9	+34
Holland	4.2	5.5	+24
Belgium	4.5	6.0	–60
Italy	14.8	20.7	–18
Denmark	19.6	12.8	–35
Ireland	13.3	15.0	–29
Britain	13.4	18.4	–

*at current value

Interest rates, on the other hand, are likely to crumble at the first sign of economic weakness.

Common Market countries with a relatively high unemployment rate, such as Italy, that maintain high interest rates will then be obliged to reflate their economies, which will call for lower bank rates.

This could well make differences in inflation rates even wider, while fixed exchange rates heighten the risk of imported inflation.

If this is the course events take, bank rates could well require more frequent and more drastic revision.

The amounts of money pumped into money markets in support of EMS exchange rates, on the other hand, may make it increasingly difficult for central banks to pursue money policies aimed at stability both at home and abroad.

If, for instance, neither inflationary currencies are devalued nor sufficient intervention funds pumped into the market, countries with relatively high inflation rates might be forced to quit the EMS.

So the crunch has yet to come, and

Continued on page 7

■ TRADE

Jostling for advantage follows Gatt talks

No sooner had the Tokyo Round of Gatt been signed, than the world's two largest trading partners, the United States and the European Community, went on the warpath.

Protectionists on both sides of the Atlantic have closed ranks and are bombarding their governments with demands for protection against allegedly unfair competition.

This round of Gatt was to liberalise trade terms and try to make them fairer.

The European Community was the first to deal a blow to the United States when the Brussels EEC Commission in late February yielded to British complaints about unjustified cost advantages of American producers of man-made fibres and permitted Britain to impose restrictions on the import of some of these goods.

The Americans have not yet retaliated; but Reubin Askew, President Carter's special trade envoy, left no doubt during his recent visit to Brussels that Europe had exposed a tender spot by giving Britain the go-ahead. He intimated that this had made it more difficult for the US Administration to resist American lobbyists complaining about unfair competition from Europe.

These complaints threaten primarily Europe's steel exporters whom American steel bosses accuse of trying to conquer market shares through dumping practices.

The critics are spearheaded by David Roderick, chief executive of the US Steel Corporation, which is expected to complain to Washington any day now.

Although the bone of contention in the cold trade war is man-made fibres and steel, the mutual accusations include other products as well.

Only a few days after permitting Britain to restrict the import of man-made fibres, the Brussels Commission instituted anti-dumping proceedings against American fertiliser manufacturers.

The Americans, in turn, desisted from measures against cheap Italian shoes only after Brussels and Rome had solemnly promised to exercise restraint.

The Americans said they were "gravely concerned" over Brussels' plan to impose import levies on vegetable oil to protect the olive oil producers of the new members, Greece and Spain, from cheap American soya bean oil and so ensure the competitiveness of European oil producers.

Memories of the "chicken war" in the early years of the Community were revived when the Americans again pointed to subsidised EEC poultry exports which harm American companies selling to non-Community markets.

The Americans pointed to the terms of Gatt whereby export subsidies should be reduced rather than increased.

Brussels, however, holds that the true danger lies in the steel business.

EEC Industrial Affairs Commissioner Count Davignon told the OECD steel symposium early this month that the steel war could have disastrous consequences for transatlantic trade relations.

Should the American steel mammoths, which already enjoy a certain protection against low-priced foreign suppliers through the "threshold price system", gain additional scope for an industrial restructuring, Count Davignon said, they could trigger a chain reaction in other branches of industry.

About two-thirds of the trade that was to be liberalised by the Tokyo Round could then be engulfed by a tide of protectionist demands and counter demands.

Davignon's unexpected trip to Washington recently shows how seriously the EEC Commission takes this danger. But, as was to be expected, he returned to Brussels empty-handed.

The Europeans consider it their steel industry's good right to institute anti-dumping proceedings. But they are also agreed that these proceedings should not go overboard.

Germany unexpectedly tried to defuse the protectionist bomb by asking — much to the surprise of Britain and the EEC Commission — that the issue of Britain's man-made fibre imports and the controls over other fibre imports already ordered by the Commission be put on the agenda of the EEC Council of Foreign Ministers.

The importance of this step lies in the legal procedure it triggered: only if the Council of Ministers approves of the import restrictions with a two-thirds majority may it be upheld.

But this approval is by no means a foregone conclusion because The Hague and Copenhagen also expressed doubts whether the Community's protective measures in favour of British manufacturers of man-made fibres were well advised. There would thus be enough votes to reverse this wrong decision.

All this has led to considerable confusion. Britain criticised the new unrest thus caused and the representative of the EEC Commission lamented the abandoning of a common position against the United States. But it is doubtful whether this position would have been tenable in the long run anyway.

Although London has claimed time and again that American manufacturers of man-made fibres have carved out themselves a huge portion of the British market due to their access to cheap raw materials in the form of low-cost oil, it is more likely that the development of the dollar-sterling exchange rate last year favoured American exports to Britain.

This together with the greater productivity of American manufacturers (than that of Europe) is likely to have been the main reason for the inroads.

Bonn justified its move by telling Brussels that it wanted to give a political signal to the United States and that a trading partner should not wantonly have heavy burdens imposed on it when world trade is in a critical situation anyway.

It remains to be seen whether Brussels will understand this line of argument.

While Europe uses primarily economic and political arguments in its dispute, the Americans point to the legal aspects of the conflict. Understandably so because they feel that this will enable them to test the viability of the Tokyo Round provisions, especially so far as they concern anti-dumping regulations.

The United States has only now accepted an ancient Community principle whereby in any dumping complaint the plaintiff industry must prove that it has suffered damage.

Citing this new procedure (new to the United States) an American diplomat said in Brussels: "We have no reason to feel guilty." In any event, the American steel manufacturers would find it extremely difficult to prove that their European competitors have caused damage.

The threshold price system shields US steel mills from outside competition. It is pegged to the prices of the cheap Japanese mills. Anyone asking higher prices and still finding buyers in the United States can not have engaged in dumping under the threshold price system.

In fact, American steel imports dropped from 21.16 m tons in 1978 to 17.52 m last year. European shipments fell by 27.6 per cent to 5.4 m tons while those from developing countries dropped by as much as 31 per cent.

Canadian and Japanese exports, on the other hand, stood their ground.

America's ambassador to the EEC, Thomas O. Enders, is convinced that peace on the trade front can be saved if we keep a cool head."

Hans-Hagen Bremer
(Die Zeit, 21 March 1980)

EEC in Africa

Continued from page 2

alleged Communist. Soviet warships still occasionally visit his country's ports but President Sekou Touré is no longer a colour-blind Soviet fellow-traveller, the EEC Commission in Brussels claims.

M. Cheysson says the late President Neto of Angola once told him in Luanda that Angola was supplied with arms, equipment, troops and military advisers by the East bloc.

But everything else Angola needed for economic reconstruction in general and for the restoration of badly-needed peace in southern Africa in particular could only be supplied by the West.

This is why M. Cheysson has no objection to a country like Angola joining the waiting list to accede to the Lomé convention.

The same goes for Mozambique. Neither country has yet formally applied to join but neither would be rejected.

According to the lastest estimates 19,000 Cuban soldiers are stationed in Angola, backed by Soviet military advisers headed by General Chakanovich, while the GDR has reorganised the Angolan police and secret service.

But the Angolan regime is beginning to suffer from the economic incompetence of its backers. Scarce foodstuffs have to be exported to Cuba, for instance.

In Ethiopia General Brissov commands 16,500 East bloc and Cuban troops, including both Soviet and GDR units. Yet in Addis Ababa leaflets critical of Colonel Mengistu, the all-powerful dictator, accuse him of, by setting up a Labour party, departing from Marxist convictions.

Ethiopia, where the Soviet Union has so far seemed firmly in control, has long been a party to the Lomé convention, as has Somalia.

There too the Soviet Union was once the chosen ally, but now that Somalian President Siad Barre has changed course there is even a prospect of the US fleet and air force being allowed to use port and air base facilities at Berbera in the event of a crisis.

Hermann Bohle
(Rheinischer Merkur / Christ und Welt, 28 March 1980)

Investment of Arab cash defended

Bonn Finance Minister Hans Matthöfer has defended the latest investment of Arab money into the fixed interest government bond market.

He told journalists that Germany must give Opec countries the chance to invest their surplus funds sensibly.

Moreover, this would stabilise the deutschemark exchange rate and help offset the balance-of-payments deficit through imported capital.

Having assured Saudi Arabia of discretion, Bonn has not released exact figures. But insiders speak of between DM5bn and DM6bn.

The Finance Ministry has stressed that it has no exact figure on the influx of money from Opec.

Since legislation on foreign investment in government notes was relaxed recently, it has become easier for the banks to sell them to foreigners.

It seems certain that it was the Saudi Arabians who approached the Finance Ministry in their search for investment possibilities.

The Finance Ministry says that all the notes are in deutschemarks, that they have fixed interest rates and are issued for at least two years.

Herr Matthöfer rejected any suggestion that Bonn sweetened the deal as an inducement.

The transaction, so far as the Saudi Arabians are concerned, is based on sound commercial reasoning. Germany provides the "solidity" Saudi Arabia needs and, besides, they need deutschemarks in their currency basket.

The interest rate, adjusted for inflation, was the same as that offered by the United States, Herr Matthöfer said.

According to him, the Opec countries achieve surpluses of at least 100bn dollars a year, and it is only reasonable for Germany to provide them with investment possibilities to promote the recycling of the money.

Only so can the Opec countries be induced to maintain their output.

Informed circles do not expect more transactions of this nature this year.

Manfred Lahnstein of the Finance Ministry, who negotiated the deal in Riyadh, rejected the contention that Bonn was driving the interest rates up.

He said that half of Bonn's net credit requirements for this year had already been met. They amount to about DM24bn.

He said that the Finance Ministry would be able to help stabilise interest rates in the second half of the year.

Federal bonds and notes issued by Bonn lately ranked at the lower end of the market in terms of interest rates which, Herr Lahnstein said, were one quarter to one percentage point lower than those of similar securities.

Heinz Murmann
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 25 March 1980)

■ BUSINESS

After 132 years, there will be no Siemens on the Siemens board

For the first time in the 132-year history of Germany's leading electrical concern, Siemens, there will be no member of the founder family at the head of the *Aufsichtsrat* (the supervisory committee in the two-tier structure of German corporations).

Peter von Siemens, the great-grandson of the founder, Werner, and chairman of the supervisory board since 1971, has decided not to serve his full term but resign two years earlier.

He says: "You must not stick to your chair, and when you do go, do so at a time when people will still say 'what a pity' rather than 'at last'."

The last Siemens (for the time being) on the supervisory board of the company that bears his name wants to step down on the day before his 70th birthday on 29 January 1981.

But in order to ensure a smooth transition his successor is to be elected this month at the forthcoming AGM. His name is a foregone conclusion. He will be Bernhard Plettner, 65, who has been chairman of the board of directors for exactly as long as Herr von Siemens has been chairman of the supervisory board.

He will be succeeded on the board by Karlheinz Kraske.

All this has been long planned and prepared — as with all personnel decisions at Siemens. Even so, the change is a major turning point in the company's history inasmuch as it now for the first time has no suitable heir from family ranks.


Werner von Siemens, the founder

As a result, the concern opted for a solution that has become customary in German corporations: the departing chairman of the board takes the chair on the supervisory board.

But this does not mean that the founder family has bowed out for good. It only means that there will be no departure from the ironclad principles of the company only for the sake of family tradition.

Whoever takes on the highest post of the concern and with it the inofficial title "head of Siemens" can expect no concessions. The chairman of the supervisory board must have been a company member from the very beginning and proved himself in several areas, including the top managerial level.

This applied to Peter von Siemens as it did to his predecessors.



The present supervisory board chairman joined the company in 1934, aged 23. When World War II broke out, he was a sales executive in Latin America, where he remained for 11 years. At 46 he became the general manager for the region and deputy board member.

After another four years, Peter von Siemens moved into the supervisory board as deputy chairman. His road to the top was now clear.

The departing supervisory board chairman expects his son Peter, now 42, to pick up the family tradition in due course and become the successor of Plettner should he decide to stay beyond the age of 70.

"Little Peter", as he is generally called in the company, would then be around 50. Says his father: "The later he gets the job, the better for him."

For an active man, he elaborates, the leap from the day-to-day management of the company to the supervisory board is also a sacrifice because the chairman of that body — at least at Siemens — sticks strictly to the rule not to interfere in the running of the company. This is reserved for the board.

If everything goes by the father's schedule, "Peter II", today a department head at the central administration for American operations, is due for promotion shortly. He is likely to become general manager this year and then become a board member.

But nothing will come his way free. He had to work hard from the very beginning, says an insider, and it was mostly the difficult tasks that were assigned to him.

He spent three years as commercial director of the Turkish subsidiary of Siemens. This was followed by a year in Mexico until he took charge of telecommunications.

Perhaps a Siemens has it easier in the company in some ways, but he can certainly not act as a crown prince. Peter von Siemens: "We don't have such a thing as a junior boss — fortunately." The only thing that matters is performance, not being part of the clan.

This makes it the more surprising that the clan has managed to retain its influence in a company that today numbers among the most broadly owned German corporations with its 400,000 individual stockholders.

Still, as Peter von Siemens sees it, the family still guarantees continuity. It is a stabilising element rather than a drawback and is most certainly not a reservoir from which to draw top executives. Siemens is a public company in the true sense, with a clear family accent.

The Siemens clan not only provides a cachet of tradition but is also the biggest stockholder. The family (now numbering about 120 adults and 80 children) share in the company stock has dropped from more than 13 to 10 per cent of the DM1.77bn capital.

This is due to the DM600m capital increase in the past decade which made the decline of the Siemens share inevitable notwithstanding the modest price at which the added shares were issued.

The family today holds stock worth a nominal DM180m with a market value of about DM960m. But this includes a nominal DM40m worth of preferred stock whose market value cannot be estimated.

There is something special about this preferred stock. Every share has a sixfold voting right. This means that nothing goes without the Siemens vote. With its common and preferred stock the family holds a blocking minority of 25 per cent at AGMs, which are generally attended by three-quarters of the capital.

But so far the Siemens clan has never found it necessary to make use of the voting rights provided by its preferred stock.

As Peter von Siemens puts it, the family stockholdings are a "fleet in being", a reserve only to be used when the company is concretely threatened by alienation.

Provisions have been made to retain the weight of this institution. The preferred stock has been bundled in what is known at Siemens as a "global share". And full authority over this packet rests with the *Siemens Vermögensverwaltung GmbH* (a type of trust company) which has five partners, chaired by Peter von Siemens. This stock cannot be passed on as an inheritance and may only be sold with the express



Bernhard Plettner
(Photo: Interpress)



Peter von Siemens
(Photos: Archiv)

approval of the board and the *Aufsichtsrat*.

Though the family members may sell smaller blocks of common stock, the clan has first option to buy any sizeable block.

Considerable blocks of common stock have already gone to foundations, especially those of the childless former supervisory board chairman Ernst von Siemens, now 76.

The Swiss-based Ernst von Siemens Foundation for the Promotion of New Blood in Music awards prizes to composers, singers and conductors which are held in such high esteem as to be dubbed a "Nobel Prize for Music".

Even though Siemens stock was first traded publicly in 1897, the corporation, which has played a major role in Germany's industrial history, has never become an "anonymous company".

Despite a huge bureaucracy which is unavoidable in such a mammoth concern, Siemens has always successfully adapted to trends and developments.

Company historian Georg Siemens once said that decisions are never made quickly in this company; rash decisions usually turn out to be the wrong ones anyway.

The American magazine *Fortune* meant pretty much the same two years ago when it headlined an article on Siemens: "Starts second but finishes first".

There is much truth in this characterisation of the late starter who gets across the finishing line first.

A comparison of Siemens with its luckless competitor, AEG Telefunken (which in its 96-year history has repeatedly tried to beat Siemens, as was the case with the construction of the first German nuclear reactors) shows that all that matters is who gets to the finish first.

Unlike AEG, Siemens has always managed to fill its key executive posts with people from its own ranks. This was made possible by the company and family tradition that made for continuity.

Now that the family is putting in a break in the supervisory board, Bernhard Plettner is the right man to act as family caretaker in the transition period.

Under his and Peter von Siemens' aegis, the German multinational concern has continued its rise to the top. Siemens went from place 29 to 19 among the world's multis and from place 10 to place 5 among the electrical giants.

With its DM28bn sales last year, Siemens ranks only after the American mammoths General Electric, IBM, ITT and the Dutch Philips concern. But Siemens has the widest range of products.

Hermann Bössenecker
(Die Zeit, 14 March 1980)

First year of EMS

Continued from page 5

against this gloomy background details of the future EMF pale in significance.

Heads of government have yet to agree whether the current European Fund for Monetary Policy Cooperation is to assume the character of a supranational central bank or merely to administer EMS reserves.

Since the final decision will certainly commit part of the member-countries' national gold and foreign exchange reserves Herr Schmidt and M. Giscard d'Estaing have agreed to postpone the debate until after their respective general elections.

The Germans are due to go the polls next October, the French next year.

Wieland Schmitz
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 March 1980)

■ THE ENVIRONMENT

State minister resigns as chemical giant is accused over waste

Willi Görlach, Hesse Environment Minister, has been obliged to resign over an ecological scandal: accusations of connivance between environmental officials and Hoechst, the Frankfurt chemicals giant.

Hoechst are alleged to have pumped illicit toxit waste into the river Main. Ministry officials on the best of terms with the company are alleged to have turned a blind eye to what was going on.

Herr Görlach took his leave as the Minister politically responsible for whatever may actually have happened. The affair makes one wonder why environmental conservation continually hits the headlines.

Inefficiency, negligence and possibly criminal behaviour were involved. Besides, the general public are more prone to sit up and take notice of reports of environmental pollution these days than they used to do.

So environmental offences are, potentially, political dynamite, and many companies have yet to appreciate the extent to which this is the case.

Let us recapitulate. Recent headlines have included the case of poison gas in a disused Hamburg factory, the Darmstadt poisoned milk case (as it was known) and waste pumped into the Rhine rather than out at sea.

Then the Hamburg branch of Boehringer, the pharmaceutical manufacturer, gained unwelcome publicity, and hardly had this affair been quietly consigned to oblivion by dint of hard work on the part of officialdom and management but the Hoechst scandal led to Herr Görlach's resignation.

In the Harz hills lead mining by Preussag came in for criticism, with allegations that in a holiday resort are the aid had been poisoned for the past 450 years.

Cows near Lingen graze listlessly in their fields, allegedly poisoned by pollution from a nearby factory. IBM too stands accused of polluting drinking water near one of its factories by unsuitable storage of toxic waste.

This list is by no means complete. It is merely intended to indicate that environmental conservation still has a long way to go before it can be deemed satisfactory from the viewpoint of either people or Mother Nature.

And this failure is as undeniable as the fact that countless legislative safeguards have been introduced and that a great deal of private initiative, trouble and expense have gone into combating pollution.

The indication nonetheless is that environmental offences are regarded by industry in much the same way as trust or monopoly offences used to be: understandable and tough luck if you happen to be caught in the act.

Gross inefficiency is the least one can say about the way in which details of storage, inspection and permit procedures at the Hamburg poison gas factory were allowed to gather dust in official files.

It is madness to allow drums full of poison to be stored on a dump insufficiently guarded even. It is negligence when a flue is opened at a nuclear power station that allows radioactive coolant to flow into the ordinary water circuit.

It may also be mere negligence when a filter is switched off at a nuclear power station, thereby making a mockery of statutory controls governing the release of harmful substances into the atmosphere.

But it is incontestably a criminal offence when a haulage firm hired to collect and dispose of highly toxic effluent simply pumps it into the nearest drain in order to make a fast buck.

There are also instances in which the offenders were unaware at the time of the toxic nature of the substances they were handling. Waste rated harmless, for instance, is suddenly reclassified, as at Merck in Darmstadt.

Confusion reigns in the Hoechst affair too. One accusation is levelled at another and it is anything but easy to identify a deliberately guilty party.

It is too easy to interpret everything in terms of ideology and lay the blame solely at the door of capitalist companies hell-bent on profit.

Allegations along these lines amount to a drumhead court-martial. The accused man is sentenced before the prosecution has even drawn up its case.

Genuine anxiety about the environment and political motives may, of course, be closely related. It is certainly true to say that environmental scandals have a nasty habit of coming to light at election time or the like.

Setting aside details that are more confusing than enlightening, the fact remains that at Hoechst and in the other cases mentioned one can but wonder what importance companies really attach to environmental conservation.

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Environmental consciousness starts with the individual who washes his car by the banks of a local stream or thoughtlessly dumps waste in the countryside.

Factory chimneys belching forth toxic waste are at the end of a chain, and the dark satanic mills are not such serious environmental offenders as they once were either.

Besides, it is wishful thinking to imagine industrial activity might conceivably avoid environmental pollution altogether. The Ruhr can never be transformed into the Bavarian foothills of the Alps.

If you live near a chemicals factory you will have to resign yourself to the fact that unpleasant smells will waft across from time to time no matter how seriously the firm takes its obligation to comply with anti-pollution regulations.

What is at stake, however, is not a smell that occasionally makes noses wrinkle; it is the extent of the environmental burden, not to mention the possibility of a genuine health hazard.

Industry claims to strictly enforce the law. But is that enough? Is it really enough to comply with official regulations that amount to little more than a blank cheque to go ahead and do one's damnedest?

Would anyone seriously deny that a level of pollution amounting to exactly half the toxin count that is currently permitted is less dangerous than the maximum permitted?

Are we to abide by the principle that only what is expressly prohibited is better left undone? Would it not be more farsighted to do a little more than is absolutely necessary?

Many companies already do so, and they include some of those already in the limelight for offences in one location or another. What is lacking is a general awareness of the need for greater care when it comes to pollution.

No-one is denying that it is out of the question to re-equip in a decade or two industrial installations that have pumped poison into the air, earth or water for a century or more (and done so legally) without taking environmental precautions worth mentioning.

No-one is seriously suggesting they should be re-equipped to preclude all possibilities of further pollution.

That would be beyond the financial or technological scope of both manufacturers and suppliers. Besides, local authorities are no less reprehensible.

There are still local authorities of surprising size who have entirely inadequate purification plant for treating municipal sewage.

In cases of doubt company executives may have to consider whether the environment should not be given the benefit. It might be better not to enlarge or to build new factories.

And surely a company that regularly makes small presents to customers and well-wishers should have more political sense than to lavish gifts, however insignificant, on local authority officials who are responsible for pollution checks on its premises.

Environmental conservation is no longer regarded as the urgent necessity it once was. Pride of place has been given to the aftermath of the oil crisis and growing unemployment.

Other requirements may have come to the fore but environmental conservation is by no means a minor consideration. It is a political issue that calls for entrepreneurial acumen.

Wolfgang Müller-Haeseler
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 24 March 1980)

Pollution of Rhine continues despite agreement

Pollution of the Rhine continues despite signed agreements, negotiations between Prime Ministers, and objections at large from people directly affected.

In December 1976 Switzerland, Germany, France and Holland agreed in Bonn to reduce the amount of chloride pumped untreated into the Rhine.

The chief offenders were the French, who pump substantial amounts of untreated effluent from potash mines in Alsace into the river.

They still are, and the Bonn agreement still doesn't work because the French National Assembly has not seen fit to ratify it.

French Premier Raymond Barre recently visited the Netherlands and spent five hours with the Dutch Premier, but their talks were inconclusive.

By the terms of the agreement France undertook to reduce by an initial 20kg its chloride input of about 130kg per second, followed by further cuts up to 60kg.

The salt which the French potash mines pump into the Rhine is particularly bad for Dutch drinking water and even water used for irrigation in Holland, so the Dutch were specially upset.

At the time the agreement was signed it was felt there would be no technical difficulty in pumping the salt effluent back underground.

But when preliminaries to this disposal procedure began, there was growing anxiety in Alsace lest the chloride pollute the water table.

Alsace has substantial reserves of ground water fed by the Rhine and its tributaries, and if they were polluted an essential commodity would no longer be at the Rhine flood plain's disposal.

Alsace's MPs in Paris, especially Pierre Weisenhorn of Haut-Rhin département, strongly objected to the idea. They were so effectively supported by their parties in the National Assembly that the government withdrew at the last moment the ratification Bill that was scheduled to be tabled at the beginning of December 1979.

The Dutch were most annoyed. So were the other parties to the agreement. They had already paid part of the cash that was to be their contribution towards the cost of chloride disposal.

Alternative disposal suggestions have since been bandied around in France with a view to reducing the salt inflow into the Rhine by the amount initially agreed in Bonn.

The most realistic proposal so far mooted seems to be the idea of processing saline effluent and purifying it so that it can be recycled and sold as a chemical raw material and as salt for winter roads.

Saltworks in Lorraine might well be roped into this arrangement, but the objection raised is that this much salt could only be marketed (if at all) to the detriment of existing producers.

Besides, it would be far too expensive. So a combination of methods, known as a cocktail, was considered.

The talks M. Barre held in Holland, accompanied by his Foreign Minister M. François-Poncet, doubtless dealt mainly with major foreign policy issues.

But the irksome European problem of pollution of the Rhine does not seem to have come any closer to a solution despite unquestionably also having been breached at the talks.

Indeed, it has come to a head even more forcibly now that people in the Alsace have successfully stalled alternative solutions that might have led to pollution of their own ground water reserves.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 26 March 1980)

■ THE ARTS

Portraying the pain in differing ways

Werner Schroeter's *Palermo or Wolfsburg* and Christel Buschmann's *Gibbi Westgermany* are both films depicting Germany as a cold, repellent country where no-one who needs a little warmth can live.

They show how people in Germany go to the dogs if they are unable to articulate what they are suffering from.

They point a relentless finger at the painful wound of unfeeling rationality, the only outlet from which appears to be self-destruction.

Palermo or Wolfsburg, which won the Golden Bear award at this year's Berlin Film Festival, and *Gibbi Westgermany*, a maiden effort impressive in its unsentimental consistency, have much in common.

In their assessment of what life in West Germany is like they certainly come to the same conclusion. Yet in terms of aesthetic procedure there could hardly be two more different films.

So those who obstinately stick to the tenet that form alone is the true content are right to shake their heads at two films being mentioned in one breath whose only point in common is "suffering from Germany."

Even so, although "suffering from Germany" may not be the brightest of new ideas it is still very much to the point.

What is so interesting about the two is their very difference, and taken together they constitute an object lesson, albeit *a coincidental and involuntary one, in radical cinema.*

In art, Frankfurt sociologist Theodor Adorno once said, the middle way is the only one that does not lead to Rome. But one is bound to add, with a frown, that it may well lead to box office success.

For years Werner Schroeter has directed poetic, ecstatic, extreme films on a shoestring. Ideas were his forte but he lacked the ability to capitalise on them.

For progressive film-makers and cinéastes he was proof, if proof were needed, that film promotion did not really work, since he received hardly a penny in funds.

Had it not been for ZDF, the Second Channel of West German TV, whom he sent copies of his films at the last minute so a minimum of cutting was possible, not even these inexpensive but so imaginative films would have been possible.

Now, at long last, he has more cash at his disposal and is in a position to work professionally. There is nothing wrong with money; it is very real and establishes a link with reality.

Now Schroeter can work on a reasonable budget his films suddenly have something to do with reality, and that is the problem.

Palermo or Wolfsburg deals with a reality Schroeter does not take seriously. He juggles with appearances of reality in much the same way as he used to juggle with peaks of traditional art form without acknowledging fundamental differences.

Virtually out of necessity a mock exemplary tale is told in terms of a dialectical trinity that fails to measure up to expectations.

Schroeter has subjected the three-hour ordeal of Nicola, his hero, to a strict threefold division.

The first part takes place in Palermo, the hero's home, where we see him cheerful, full of light and music, but poor as a church mouse and obliged to go abroad to earn the cash his father needs to buy an olive grove.

The second is in Wolfsburg, where Nicola works in the grim, impersonal, noisy alien atmosphere of the Volkswagen city.

Unable to speak the language, he even misunderstands the language of love; the girl he wants to get engaged to merely uses him to make her friends jealous. He is so helpless he knifes his rivals in a pointless argument.

In Part Three we see him in the dock. Was it murder or self-defence? Schroeter transforms the hearing into an absurd grotesque and clash between the ways of life of North and South.

The final scene suggests that Nicola, although acquitted, only comes to himself and regains his identity when he admits his guilt to himself.

It is, then, the classic dialectical approach of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, or arguably South, North and something else (but what?).

It is arguably a tribute to Schroeter's artistic radicalism that the director so clearly sides with the Southern way of life that the synthesis fails to materialise.

Up to a point this is true, but Schroeter mixes his metaphors beforehand in taking an almost soberly documentary view of the Sicilian part while reducing the Wolfsburg scenes to opera and melodrama.

Instead of epitomising the irreconcilable nature of the differences, stilistic gestures reduce characters to caricatures rather than alienating them as was surely intended.

A touch of radicalism remains but is put paid to by reality inasmuch as little is brought to light beyond what are well-known facts.

The crucial facts seem a foregone conclusion before anything decisive has happened, as is evident in the handful of successful scenes that make up the film as a whole.

Take, for instance, the dreamy longing implicit in the telephoto run-in to Palermo or the swift run-up to the Volkswagen factory gate.

Nicola is so shocked by the factory gate that he imagines it must surely be the East German border, but he discovers he has to pass it every day.

Intention and necessity are here conclusively transformed into celluloid counterpoint, but in his film as a whole they are a failure because judgment has already been passed and is predictable.

The result has more to do with prejudice in the literal sense than with radicalism.

Christel Buschmann took the opposite direction in her first film, *Gibbi Westgermany*. She has unswervingly dealt with her title role, ably assisted by her detailed acquaintanceship with the background and heedless of either convention or commerce.

She develops her asthetics from the hero's psyche. At first glance this makes her film very much more limited in scope, clearer and hearteningly more modest than *Palermo or Wolfsburg*.

She disconcertingly runs the risk of adopting hero Gibbi's inarticulacy. There is not a single meaningful word that might set right images that fail to convey their message.

Yet this limitation to exclusively optical argumentation is a truly successful radical approach.

Gibbi comes home after years at sea and skulks around his mother's chip shop in St Pauli, Hamburg, like a cat on a hot tin roof.

The glances, the street feeling and the emotions suppressed with difficulty are weird and impossible to describe.


It is a return home by someone who can no longer do without home yet the moment he does return promptly despairs of the reality of home, which fails to live up to the expectations he dreamt up far away.

Christel Buschmann banishes all feelings of warmth from her imagery, successfully, superbly avoiding even the marest suspicion of sentimentality.

Never have I seen the dialectic of this major topic dealt with in greater detail or with greater tenderness on film. She wisely leaves to pictures and music what others only talk to pieces.

The result is an appearance of pitiless harshness that is surprising for a female director. Christel Buschmann knows what she shows us, however, and is for-

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Knifing scene in 'Palermo or Wolfsburg'. (Photo: prokino München)

Continued from page 10

tunate in her casting, especially in the choice of Jörg Pfennigwert and Eva-Maria Hagen.

So the few flaws in the plot sequence, such as the fact that Gibbi is sent to a lunatic asylum, are neither here nor there. The intensity of the film is such that the gaps are readily filled by the audience.

Detailing each new development in anxious precision, a typical beginner's mistake, would have been infinitely worse.

The laconic, self-assured matter-of-factness of *Gibbi Westgermany* is what makes the film such a remarkable debut for Frau Buschmann as a director.

Peter Buchka

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 March 1980)

Artists hold a publicity festival

Artists in Hamburg, long a poor second in public esteem behind theatre, which is subsidised to the hilt, are organising an art festival to draw attention to themselves.

It will be held from 11 to 19 October and aim at "a change in the cultural climate in Hamburg in favour of the arts, opening up a new public and bringing pressure to bear on politicians to get down to systematic work on promotion of the arts."

The nucleus of this move is a member Freie Vereinigung of Hamburg artists set up by painters and sculptors about a year ago in dissatisfaction with the inactivity of their professional organisation.

The Vereinigung has marshalled substantial support. The director of Hamburg's Kunstverein is sympathetic, as is the manager of the city's Kommunales Kino.

Künstlerhaus Weidenallee, a workshop cooperative, is strongly in favour of the festival move. So is the College of Art, an organisation of women artists and some of the 100 or so Hamburg gallery owners.

They will all be taking part in the autumn art festival, holding exhibitions, opening to the public, showing art films, holding happenings, running Underground painting sessions and street scenes, talk shows and a jumbo gala in the Markthalle, a major communication centre.

Preliminaries are supervised by a working party in which the various groups are represented. It is deciding how to allocate the DM70,000 the municipal arts department has initially earmarked for the festival.

Further cash is to be raised in donations and from sales of a monthly Vereinigung magazine in A4 format entitled (in German) Partisan and Autonomous Paper by and for the Free Purification of Art in Hamburg.

These funds will be used to cover special expenditure such as rent, equipment, expenses, cost of materials and advertising.

Exhibitions and the like held by established institutions will be expected to pay their own way. So there is unlikely to be much embittered infighting over how the municipal subsidy is to be allocated.

Objections to the aims of the entire "concerted action" may well come to a head soon, though. Gallery owners in particular claim it looks more like being an art policy circus than advertising for the arts.

Some of them are unhappy that the organisers have suddenly discovered that making grandiose noises can prove good publicity.

The municipal arts department is certainly respectful, which satisfies the organisers but by no means comes as a surprise to them.

Senator Tarnowski, head of the arts department, has done his reputation no good by appearing to have frightened off good theatre directors and had yet to get off to any kind of a start in arts planning.

He has been left, arguably, with no alternative but to try and make friends with artists and sculptors, whose lot could hardly have been worse, and for whom any change was a change for the better.

Jürgen Schmidt

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 13 March 1980)

■ EDUCATION

Special school tries to help girls with behavioural disturbances

Sixteen students are normally in the class. But only nine manage to get there on Monday.

And those who do come have the Monday morning blues.

All 16 are girls with behavioural disturbances and they are enrolled in a special school for a year in an effort to get a minimum education certificate.

Once they had attended *Hauptschule*, which provides the compulsory minimum of education in Germany. But they all dropped out.

Now, without at least a certificate from this special school, employment prospects would be slim.

And few do get through.

The first hour is devoted to arithmetic; but the girls' heads are still fuzzy from the weekend. Two actually participate in the lesson — the others are dozing. Anyway, classwork progresses by going back to simple addition. Some of the girls now pay a bit of attention. Monika who is an epileptic, fakes a fit, causing a stir.

"Stand up, Monika!" the teacher says harshly. "How much is 11 times 14?"

Monika thinks with obvious difficulty. She has decided to postpone the fit until later.

But not all of her fits are faked. Once she had to be taken away in an ambulance.

For the teacher, it is a nerve-wracking business to separate the real from the faked fits. In any event, what little attention there was in class is now gone.

Petra, a beautiful half-caste, suddenly pulls up her sleeve. She had just spent a week in a psychiatric ward for drug addict.

Petra was a problem child from the very beginning. Her parents, both civil servants, adopted her when she was small and were overprotective. She started using hashish in kindergarten.

Due to her behavioural disturbance, she was taken out of *Hauptschule* and put into a special school for problem children. Now she is showing her classmates the needle marks on her arm.

Unlike Monika, whose bumps and scratches on the head revolt the others, Petra is admired for her mainlining.

"Roll down your sleeve. We all know you want to die," the teacher says.

The girls start wondering if there is something wrong with the school bell. Class just keeps dragging on.

The next lesson is civics. "Who may vote? Who can stand for election?" Who cares — these children will never vote. Why should they, and for whom?

Next the class goes to the school kitchen for cooking lessons. These girls are certainly not spoiled at home so far as food is concerned. But whatever is put before them, be it asparagus or pudding, meets with the same grunt of disgust.

The instructor is desperate. None of the girls wants to eat what has been prepared. The only things they will accept are noodles, chicken and perhaps cake. Everything else is pushed aside.

Tuesday: They are all interested in learning the biological facts about babies, but not about child care. Next week the class is to visit *pro familie* (a family planning agency).

Now the class is told how to behave, that only one should speak at a time and that a hand must be raised if one of them wants to ask a question.

Heike has a pregnancy behind her. She was actually happy about it but she miscarried. Heike is a Gypsy girl and the man she loves has made her his wife by Gypsy custom. He has five children all about her own age. They run a junk shop and she proudly tells her classmates that she is the "executive secretary."

She attends two days a week at most, the notes to the teacher being written by her mother in barely legible German.

The use of the language builds an impenetrable barrier between teacher and pupils. The children don't speak his language and don't understand him.

Needlework saves the day. They make stuffed animal toys which they take to bed with them. It's something to love ... there is no-one else.

The animal gives them the warmth they otherwise lack. So why not just give them stuffed animals instead of trying to impart education?

Wednesday: It is the most taxing day of the week, with economics, religion, German, arithmetic, first aid and dietetics on the schedule.

Fourteen of the 16 girls are present. But they are totally undisciplined and show interest only if the subject somehow relates to their present, past or future lives. The rest, just doze. They hear the teacher's words as a distant rumbling.

Then there is a fight. The language is vulgar. The fight actually started during a short break and was then continued in the classroom. It came about out of boredom and pent-up frustration. What mattered was that it provided an opportunity for physical contact even if this only consisted of scratching and lashing out at each other.

The next lesson is one they enjoy: singing.

There are two Turkish girls in the class, Myase and Asuman, who is 17 and has just seen the arrival of her sixth brother. There is also a Spanish girl, Mercedes, and Ursula, who is Polish.

Whenever the others are at a loss to find a scapegoat for something they pick on the foreign children.

When it comes to social studies, the foreigners are asked to tell about their home countries and their childhood there. This is one of the few times when the others actually listen. Myase will have to marry a man chosen by her parents. For the Germans this is unimaginable, and they have a lot of sympathy for their foreign classmates — for that one period.

Thursday: This is a good day with two hours of sports followed by the big break. One of the girls always brings a bottle of schnapps for the break. Then comes arithmetic again with the tables. This is followed by religion, a subject they all like.

They are permitted to talk about themselves, their families, school and how bad the teachers are, and all get good marks in this subject — their only ones.

Friday: absenteeism is greatest on Fridays and Mondays. This day schoolwork consists of four hours home economics. They talk about such things as refrigerators, beds, appliances, etc.

At home the laundry is still done by hand. But all have a car and a television set.

Silke has 14 brothers and sisters, and the family lives in four rooms. There is no washing machine. The two Turkish girls live in barracks on the premises of their father's employer.

Only Elena could tell the class about all these appliances and more. But Elena never opens her mouth in class. She only talks with her mother and her small sister. No-one else knows her voice. Yet her written work is good — in fact very good.

She is one of the very few who will actually graduate.

Elena lives in an upper-class suburb. Her father is a politician and great advocate of the handicapped and has done a lot of good in this sector. Trouble is, he hasn't noticed that his daughter is one of them. She attends school daily, her face scratched by herself through pent-up frustration ... and never says a word.

Who can ever love Elena? She is fat, she eats too much and doesn't communicate.

None of her classmates wants anything to do with her because she is different. She doesn't smoke, doesn't drink and doesn't use foul language. So Elena and the foreign girls are always the butt of the others' spite and frustration.

Friday ends with German and correspondence. What is a cheque? How much untruth is there in the "true romance" stories which everybody reads?

Manuela has had to be institutionalised every time her father was in prison and her mother went on the streets.

She is flabbergasted when the teacher tells her that all these novels are trash. She is addicted to them, as is Petra. They read the stuff every free minute, experiencing vicarious "romance".

Manuela understands nothing. For a pat she would follow a man to the North Pole and for an embrace she would join a pimp's stable. But Manuela has a cleft palate and no pimp would have her.

All will leave school. But only one or at best two will get the coveted school leaving certificate.

For Elena it will be useless. Mercedes, the Spanish girl, will take it home with her, marry, have children and forget about having ever been in Germany.

The others, if they are lucky, will get jobs as room maids in some hotel or as unskilled workers in a supermarket. They will earn a bit of money and get married. All will marry except Elena and Manuela whose handicaps are such as to preclude this.

Helga has an affair with a man who pastes posters during the day and works in a transvestite bar at night. He is drunk most of the time but even so he wants to have children with her; but she knows how to prevent this.

More will be said on this subject at *pro familie* next week.

It has never occured to Helga that her man could be a homosexual. He is gentle and never shouts — just like one of the cuddly toys.

Kirsten's parents have a butchery where she will work and get a belting daily. She will share her mother's lot and be humiliated in front of customers and apprentices.

Her mother, incidentally, has been in a mental hospital ever since her fifth child was born; so the father needs the daughter as cheap labour in the shop.

Reports will be issued on the last day before the big annual school holidays — pieces of paper which they might just as well use to wrap their sandwiches. And the two who will pass are so handicapped that they might just as well do the same with their passing certificates.

None will find an apprenticeship and none will go to the polls at election time. Their children will be born with a deficit because the mothers were born with one. What good was school from Monday through Friday?

Fritz Feizer

(Die Zeit, 21 March 1980)

■ HEALTH

Study shows more children starting to smoke, and at an earlier age

Smokers' corners at school, even entire classrooms where smoking is not prohibited, were hailed as progress by the anti-authoritarian movement 10 or 15 years ago. But in medical terms they are merely the beginning of an alarming development.

Some years ago a poll at 1,250 schools in Baden-Württemberg revealed a substantial increase in the number of smokers at more than half the schools where smoking was allowed.

A countrywide survey, the results of which have just been published, confirms this trend.

The preventive oncology research unit, a group at Heidelberg University's Mannheim clinical faculty, sent 10,000 questionnaires, each listing 12 questions, to 35 schools in five *Länder*.

Schools in the various Federal states were selected at random and included a cross-section of primary and secondary schools and vocational colleges.

Pupils were asked to fill in and return questionnaires anonymously, and 9,000 did so, which is an unusually high percentage of replies.

Taking 10- to 19-year-olds on average, nearly 25 per cent of boys and 21 per cent of girls smoke. So girls have almost drawn level in this age group, whereas substantially fewer women than men smoke on average for the population as a whole.



The overall figures are 42.6 per cent of men and 27.5 per cent of women, but for some time the women have been sadly gaining ground, and the Mannheim survey shows them to be almost level-pegging at school.

Children start smoking at a very early age. More than three per cent of 10-year-olds describe themselves as smokers. A good 43 per cent of 19-year-olds do so, boys and girls in virtually equal measure.

Most very young smokers claim to smoke up to five cigarettes a day, but among 14-year-olds 20 a day boys and girls are by no means unusual.

What is more, the trend is still in full swing. Most 18-year-old smokers reckon not to have started smoking until long after they were 10, whereas 57 per cent of 10-year-old boy smokers (and 25 per cent of girls) reckon to have been smoking for some time.

So the signs are that children are taking to tobacco at an increasingly early age, and it goes without saying that the health hazard is greater the longer a person has been inhaling tobacco smoke.

The harmful effects on the body accumulate over the years. Thus a 50-year-old smoker stands a 40-per-cent higher risk of dying of the after-effects of smoking than a non-smoker if he started smoking after the age of thirty.

But the risk skyrockets to over 200 per cent if the 50-year-old smoker has been on the weed since before the age of fifteen, and even if he did not start until 15 to 19, the risk he runs is 149-per-cent greater than the non-smoker's.

And these figures do not even tell the whole story. Smokers who started the habit before 15 are four times more likely to die of lung cancer than smokers who did not start until 25 or older.

The statistics are more alarming still when it comes to the prospects for people who manage to give up smoking, especially if they took up smoking at an early age.

As a rule smokers who manage to give up the habit stand a fair chance of being able to forget about nicotine-induced health hazards sooner or later when the likelihood of them dying of lung cancer or the like is down to the non-smoker's level.

In respect of lung cancer they need to have stopped smoking for about 15 years before the risk is down to relative zero, although the worst is over, as it were, after a five-year cooling-off-period.

In respect of heart attacks and other nicotine-induced causes of death, former smokers are back to statistical normal in substantially less time.

But none of these figures apply to the smoker who has smoked since childhood or youth. Even if he or she stops smoking at some time or other the health hazard and risk of illness will never return to normal.

The risk will always remain about 30 per cent above average. No-one knows exactly why, but the juvenile body is presumed to be much more sensitive than the adult's, cells being permanently damaged by the contents of cigarette smoke.

This assumption, coupled with the undisputed fact that smoking grows more dangerous the longer it is practised and the higher the tobacco consumption, makes the Mannheim findings all the more disturbing.

Smoking is particularly widespread at West German *Grund-* and *Hauptschule*, the secondary school that does not groom pupils for university education.

At these schools nearly 20 per cent of girls and over 28 per cent of boys to be regular smokers. The figures much lower, 7 and 9 per cent respectively, at *Gymnasium*, the German equivalent of the British grammar school or the French lycée.

There is clearly a social factor here, and it would surely be up to cation authorities to reschedule the riculum or arrange for lessons to i more comprehensive information the hazards of smoking.

Gymnasium students, it can be concluded, are more clearly aware risks smokers run, whereas pupils other secondary schools are less well formed.

Parents too much be reminded of ir responsibility. It is no longer the as used always to be maintained, children and young people start smoking as a gesture of defiance or revolt.

Nowadays they usually do so in tion of a habit their parents have; the children know for a fact that parents do not have an uneasy conscience about smoking.

Parents are seen to smoke with ous pleasure, and children seem likely to take up the habit when t mother smokes too (much more so when only their father smokes).

Boyfriends or girlfriends who are an equally important influence the one doesn't smoke, the other is likely to start.

From the first cigarette, smoked of curiosity or as a dare or whatever, is but a small step to getting hooked the habit.

Sixteen per cent of 11-year-old claim to smoke because they like it, by the age of 18 no fewer than 72 per cent of young smokers belong to the category.

So the health risks young newcomers to smoking run are extremely serious and last a lifetime.

As a general rule they are either aware of the risks or fail to appreciate how serious they are, especially as after-effects are not likely to occur for 20 years or more.

Parents and teachers thus hold a heavy responsibility, as do adults in general. According to the Mannheim findings, only one parent in four of 10-year-old smokers know their child smokes.

Much more surprisingly, 8 per cent of parents of 12-year-olds agree to their children smoking.

As for the parents of 15-year-old smokers, more than 15 per cent are prepared to accept the fact that their daughters smoke and more than 26 per cent are reconciled to their sons smoking.

Jörg Tröger

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 March 1980)

Drinking among the young 'alarming,' says minister

Drinking is alarmingly widespread among young people, Friedhelm Farthmann, North Rhine-Westphalian Minister of Labour and Social Order, told a 10 March Düsseldorf conference on addiction.

Fifty-four per cent of young people aged 12 to 24 drink alcohol daily, specialists report, and Herr Farthmann added that one youngster in three prefers spirits.

In North-Rhine-Westphalia alone an estimated 30,000 youngsters aged under 25 are actual or potential alcoholics. The Minister appealed to adults to set young people an example in their attitude towards alcohol and nicotine.

The drug problem, he said, was by no means limited to prohibited narcotics; abuse of alcohol and nicotine could cause physical damage too.

There were instances in which the damage was in no way less serious than in cases of what drug addiction is conventionally taken to mean.

Chain smokers in particular ran a serious risk of ruining their health. Smoking, Herr Farthmann said, was at least partly to blame for the poor health of one sick person in six.

Between 80,000 and 140,000 people a year died premature deaths in the Federal Republic of Germany as a result of nicotine.

dpa/ddp

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 11 March 1980)

■ PHILOSOPHY

Reflections on Marx, loneliness, illness and 'the slide to disaster'

Erich Fromm has died in Lugano, Switzerland, a few days before his 80th birthday. He was born in Frankfurt in 1900. The philosopher, psychologist and anthropologist was one of the last of the Grand Old Men of the Frankfurt School. He left Nazi Germany in 1934 to settle in the United States where his works found a wide readership. Later, he acquired a considerable following in Germany as well. This interview, by Jürgen Lodemann and Micaela Lämmle, was one of the last he gave.

Question: Professor Fromm, what role did your parents and their origin play in your works?

A: I was born as the only child — and that's bad enough — of rather neurotic, over anxious parents coming from very orthodox Jewish families on both sides, with a long rabbinical tradition. It was a medieval world of traditional Jewry in which I lived.

It was not yet the bourgeois world; and it is from this medieval environment that I drew my traditions and my admirations and my idols. So I lived half in the old and true Jewish tradition and half in the modern world. I went to school in Germany — in Frankfurt — and absorbed the same influences to which all other young Germans were exposed at that time.

But I remained very much alone. Not only because one was always in a somewhat special position as a Jew in Germany at that time, but also because I was not quite at home in either of the worlds in which I lived. Nor was I at home in the old traditions.

'I lived half in the old and true Jewish tradition and half in the modern world . . . I remained very much alone. Not only because one was always in a somewhat special position as a Jew in Germany at that time, but also because I was not quite at home in either of the worlds in which I lived.'

My father was a merchant and was ashamed of it because he, too, had wanted to become a rabbi. When I was a boy, I always felt ashamed when somebody said "I am a merchant" because I always hat do think of the poor man and how ashamed he himself must be feeling about having to spend all his time making money.

So there you had the medieval versus the modern viewpoint. And so I grew up as a very lonely child. I was ready for anything that would deliver me from this loneliness.

For me, this was from the very beginning the prophets and messianic hope. This hope was very pronounced among traditional Jews. It has nothing to do with Zionism; it was a creed: the world will be redeemed, not through disaster but in a grand world improvement. This is how you can find it written in the prophets.

This messianic motif has two elements: a religious, aimed at perfecting man and his concentrating on intellectual, spiritual and moral standards and a political element aimed at a genuine transformation of the world, a new society that will eventually realise these religious principles.

What I want to say is that this messianic idea is the redeeming thing that has remained with me to this day. It is an idea in which the religious and the political elements are inseparable.

Q: But how did you come to study psychology?

A: Well, I guess that was because I became more and more neurotic. I can only thank God that I did not go round the bend altogether considering my overanxious parents. Perhaps I also owe it to impressions at the time which had a great effect on me.

Q: Did you at that time come to the Freud type of analysis without any conflicts or did you have your doubts about it?

A: Oh no. I was a good disciple and I had no doubts. The whole thing impressed me greatly. But the way it is with such doctrines I simply suppressed my doubts and so I remained a good Freudian throughout my time at university. But then doubts began coming up. Still, I graduated at the Berlin Institute of Psychology.

That was in 1931 — or maybe 1932. It was absolutely orthodox. Then I analysed for five or six years, strictly according to the book . . . the way I had learned to do it. In other words, I expected to hear from the patient what the theory — or the dogma if you like — expected of me to hear. I expected what I had to expect and what any true analyst had to find, given the necessary patience.

Q: What you mean is that there is a theory and that it is presented to the patient: Is that the point at which your criticism set in?

A: Yes. I finally found out that I always heard what I expected to hear. Never anything new. There were always the routine terms: oedipus complex, fear of castration and that sort of thing. And when I saw the constant recurrence of it I was glad when the patient presented a dream that fitted the pattern.

But eventually I realised that I knew too little about the patient as a person. And secondly, I became increasingly bored with the whole thing. Little by little I started asking myself what it was I really saw and then my eyes were opened and I saw the patient as a whole. I began to shed the libido theory, which was terribly confining anyway, and tried to understand the whole person and his structure and his position not only in the family but in society as well.

Q: What did you find particularly confining about Freud's theory?

A: Well, above all its bourgeois attitude with the family as the ultimate reality. Freud was unable to look beyond the family, the bourgeois family . . . unlike other thinkers like the much more radical John Stewart Mill, not to mention Karl Marx. Freud was as confined as the bourgeoisie and the whole bourgeois structure. What mattered was possession and success.

'Hardly any great philosopher has been so badly distorted as Marx — both by the Communists and the Social Democrats . . . The pathos behind Marx was of a religious nature although he sharply criticised religion.'

Q: Does that also apply to Freud's image of man and woman?

A: Well, that was really one of the most amazing things; I mean, that such a great psychologist, out of his male chauvinist attitude, wanted to rationalise and prove scientifically that women are biologically lesser creatures. This is roughly like the arguments used against negros or those Hitler used against the Jews.

Q: What role did Marxism play for you, a religiously oriented person?

A: Hardly any great philosopher has been so badly distorted as Marx — both by the Communists and the Social Democrats, both of whom interpreted Marx to the effect that what mattered was for the working class to live as happily as the bourgeoisie; in other words, a bourgeoisie for all.

This was both the Stalinist and the reformistic solution. What Marx wanted was to put man in the centre again. The pathos behind Marx was of a religious nature although he sharply criticised religion — not from a bourgeois-atheistic vantage point but from a religious-atheistic viewpoint, along the lines of Ernst Bloch who represented this view very clearly and radically.

What mattered for Marx was the realisation of religiousness in real life, to have a society structured in such a way that the principles of justice, love, truthfulness — or of being rather than having, as I put it in one of my books — prevail in daily life.

Marx came a hundred years too early. He lived in a time of which he believed that it marked the end of the capitalist system. But he was badly mistaken. A hundred years ago the capitalist system still had its peak before it.


'People are so far removed from genuine religious experience that they take appearances for reality, that they fall for things that don't activate them, don't change them; things that they can find in a much better and beautiful form in the existing religions.'

If Marx were living today, in the crisis of capitalism, when many people have come to realise that it is untenable in the long run, his message would have been much more effective. It could not have been as easily distorted as happened then, almost of necessity: when somebody comes and formulates a counter theory to capitalism at its peak then it is only natural to twist it and turn it into a purely economic problem, a purely economic demand. And that's what happened.

Q: And now you mean that our present capitalist society is in a crisis which for purely economic reasons forces it to revert to this type of religiousness?

A: I believe that a great many people are prepared today to seek a road that would truly satisfy man — a road that would respect man. They are people who feel that a life where everything serves money, competition and exploitation is in reality a life that makes people unhappy.

For this reason there are so many people now who embrace Eastern philosophies . . . in fact, I'd say, who "fall for them." Most of this stuff is pure fake. It is the commercialisation of religious, terested in Buddhism and Zen Buddhism and Taoism . . . very seriously interested and more than interested. But what's happening today is no serious what's happening today is no serious interest; it is salesmanship with modern business methods, complete with advertising, trying to sell something that will satisfy religious feelings and longings.



Erich Fromm (Photo: dpa)

The people are so far removed from genuine religious experience that they take appearances for reality, that they fall for things that don't activate them, don't change them; things they can find in a much better and more beautiful form in the existing religions.

Q: You once wrote that Europe has to this day not been Christian. This is actually an enormity.

A: Well, it isn't such an enormity though it is perhaps somewhat surprising because we lived in an illusion. What is Christianity? Jesus was a man, he was poor and wanted no possessions, no power; but temptation was put in his way, temptation to power, and he rejected it.

He was a man full of love who gave his life for the people. This is contrasted by the heathen principle of the old Greeks, the old Teutons, that says: what matters is power, supremacy, and it is nice to die if you know that you are the victor.

So now let us ask: where is the Christian spirit in Europe? Whom do we admire today? Do we admire the poor? Do we admire those who make sacrifices? Do we admire those who love?

Q: You once wrote: we live in a society of notoriously unhappy people.

A: Yes, if you keep your eyes open you can see it. I mean, most people pretend to be happy — even to themselves — because if you are unhappy you are a failure.

So you wear the mask of happiness because otherwise you'll lose your credit on the market and you will no longer be a normal and successful person. But just look at the people. You can see the unrest and irritability behind the mask, you can see annoyance, depression, sleeplessness, unhappiness.

'The most normal (people) are the sickest. And the sick are the healthy. I know that sounds witty and exaggerated. But I am very serious about it.'

At the very beginning of this century people spoke of the *malaise du siècle*. That is what Freud called the discomfiture in culture. But it is not discomfiture in culture; it is discomfiture in bourgeois society that has made man a workhorse and that has prevented all that is important: the ability to love, to be there for others, to think and not to be an instrument of the economy but the ultimate purpose of all economic processes.

Q: Does this mean that the people we

Continued on page 14

■ MODERN LIVING

Demand for coal returns, but where have all the miners gone?

Change of shift at the Dortmund Gneisenau coal mine. The men going off work are in the showers. One sings a somewhat gaudy tune as black water runs off grimy bodies.

Werner Hausmann tosses his dirty work clothes in the big container before changing: "When you write your article let them know that we still work as hard as ever." The other men agree "It's a rotten job", says one. And indeed, standing there in his grey longjohns he certainly does not look like the fellow who hit the jackpot. He is black from tip to toe. "Even at night, when I blow my nose there is still coaldust coming out", says he.

The men are tired and not particularly talkative. They change silently and mechanically, a word or two comes forth as if it had to be squeezed out. There is a terse sentence about the next vacation, about the pigeon loft at home or about soccer.

Before leaving, Hausmann says that he would never swop with some poor beggar working on an assembly line.

The mine shafts are hot and dusty and damp. There is no headroom. The men collect the coal once the machines have loosened *it* by the ton, *totally* surrounded by impenetrable dust. All that is visible are the torches on their helmets.

Down there, 1,228 metres below the surface, you soon understand what they mean by tough work. *You also understand why people are not exactly* queueing up for this kind of work.

The mining industry in this country would come to a standstill if it were not for the foreign workers. The Miners Union organ *Die Einheit* (unity) recently wrote: "The demand for coal will rise as the *chances* of getting enough *miners* diminish. Labour is about to become the number one problem of the industry."

Mining executives admit quite freely that they are plagued by labour shortages, that their staff is too old and that they would be happy to hire new blood. *But while some are pessimistic, others* see the future in a rosier light.

One says: "Five years ago, we trained one whereas now we are training 200 miners a year."

But statistics do not support this optimism: The average age of German *miners working underground is 40. In* the next 10 to 15 years some 70 per cent of these people will reach retirement age; and even now the industry is short of *3,000* men.

No-one knows where they are to come from. In fact, this very statistic *does little to promote the image of the* miner as an occupation: despite undeniable progress in improving working conditions, the quota of occupational diseases among miners is 40 times greater than the average among the working population. The number of severe and *fatal accidents* is also *many times greater* than in other branches of industry.

Mining is almost completely mechanised nowadays, the hammer and pickaxe having been replaced by sophisticated machinery. But the dirt, noise and tropical humidity have remained. So has *the work in a doubled over position.*

Our affluent society is therefore unlikely to view mining as an ideal job: 150,000 miners have been disabled since 1949.

But then, mining has never been considered easy work, and even 100 years ago a miner-poet wrote: "The absence of *whip and shackles is all that distin*guishes the miner from the galleyslave."

In those days, special trains carried thousands of Silesians, Poles and Russians to the gates of German mines, each equipped with hammer and pickaxe. It was the heyday of coal and above all the coal barons who converted it into pure gold. It was coal that led to the first industrial revolution. The miner himself was regarded as a nonentity. All this changed in the Nazi era when coal was essential for the war effort and the miner was declared a "hero of labour" and received extra rations.

The same was true in the immediate post-war years when Germany's economic miracle depended on coal. The miner was king and his wages tops.

But then came oil, and coal was only spoken of when crises arose: 300,000 miners have lost their jobs in the past 20 years and of the then 173 mines, only 40 remain.

But the oil price explosion has led to a renaissance of coal. All of a sudden, coal and miners are in demand again.

Jochen Robok of the Gneisenau *mines*, says: "The *miner has suddenly* become someone again. Mining has become attractive because it offers better career prospects than ever before due to special training facilities."

But Herr Robok realises that labour shortage remains a bugbear.

Nobody wanting to become a miner today will have any difficulty. This is also true of those who switched to other work during the coal crisis.

Down in the shafts one meets more and more people who had once been miners and then gone to the auto industry to work *on* the assembly line until they were so fed up that they were prepared to take a DM400 a month cut only to get back to less soul-destroying work.

The days when a miner earned top wages are over. Today, the pay for *mining is somewhere in the middle* of the scale.

Ruhrkohle AG executives realise that the pay must be raised. As Herr Robok puts it: "There is a lot of lost time to be made up for."

What he is thinking of is shorter *working hours and a further humanisa*tion of work plus higher wages. After all, new blood can only be attracted by financial incentives.

The shrinking process in the mining industry has left its mark. The fear of being sacked is still there. This becomes *particularly clear when talking to the* miners in private.

He says: "In 1962, they gave m[...] boot. Today they are trying to [...] again with top pay offers. How stu[...] they really think we are?"

But foreman Franke at the Gneis[...] mine sees it differently. His son is [...] to become a miner although only [...] years ago he would have dissuaded [...] young man from contemplating [...] type of work.

Werner Hausmann has no sons [...] *he has is two daughters* with who[...] lives in an old miner's cottage. The [...] of houses that was erected by the [...] pany survived the war — and look[...] The paint is peeling and the wi[...] frames are full of dry rot.

Inside, the house is furnished ex[...] sively in imitation old *German* pa[...] furniture. Both daughters are attend[...] secondary school, and the elder has [...] come politically involved on behalf [...] the Greens (environmentalists) — [...] to her father's chagrin.

"This whole anti-nuke business is [...] nonsense. We need nuclear power if [...] are not to become pawns of the Arab[...] says Herr Hausmann.

He himself is an SPD voter beca[...] "Schmidt's OK."

He doesn't think much of [...] struggle, which he considers past histor[...]

The worker, he says, is better off [...] day than ever before. It doesn't both[...] Herr Hausmann that his take-home p[...] of DM1,900 does not exactly permit [...] *to live in luxury. "It's enough* for me [...] live decently."

Far more important than money [...] the working conditions. "Work in the [...] shaft is bloody tough."

Small wonder, then, that Wern[...] Hausmann falls asleep in his easy ch[...] by 8 p.m. *Gernot Müller-Seiten*

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 15 March 198[...])

Reflections

Continued from page 13

generally term normal are actually sick from your vantage point?

A: Oh yes. The most normal are the sickest. And the sick are the healthy. I know that sounds witty and exaggerated. But I am very serious about it. The sick person shows that he has not yet so suppressed certain human things that they can no longer clash with cultural patterns but that they do clash and thus cause symptoms of illness.

Like pain, such a symptom is only a sign that something is wrong. Lucky those who have symptoms. If man could *not feel pain he would be in a very dan*gerous position. But many people — I mean the normal ones — are so adapted, have rid themselves of everything that is their very own, they are so alienated and so much a robot-like instrument that they no longer feel a conflict. In other words, their real sentiments, their love, their hate, have already been suppressed or have so atrophied that these people present the picture of a chronic light *schizophrenia.*

Q: And the reasons?

A: The reasons are obvious: our society is based on the principle that the aim in life is more production and more consumption. Progress in economy and technology. Not man. What is good for *man* interests no-one. Not *even what is* harmful to man plays any role. Many of our advertisements praise things that are harmful and indeed deadly.

Q: You wrote that our society today must start thinking again — if for no other reason then for economic ones. You pointed to the Club of Rome.

A: There are publications today — and not only those commissioned by the Club of Rome but by a number of other *researchers — which show that if we* continue on this road, if we go on consuming everything that comes our way, if we destroy nature, leaving our heirs nothing but a destroyed and impoverished and poisoned world, if people continue to be attached to profit rather than life and if they continue seeking power, a nuclear disaster must come of necessity. We shall have another war.

It is said that today 40 nations can use nuclear energy. All this is being sold for profit. But a number of researchers have shown that, for purely economic reasons, our raw materials will be exhausted in 50 to 60 years, that the poor nations will become poorer and poorer and the rich ones richer and richer and that, ultimately, disaster must strike.

Q: But you also include the Eastern, *socalled Marxist, society in the industrial* society ...

A: Yes, indeed. The East Bloc is even worse. They don't even have the living and progressive elements that capitalism *has. They have a state capitalism* that corresponds to the conservative stage of the Metternich era.

'Almost everything indicates that we will continue on our course and slither into disaster ... as long as there is a slight chance ... we must not give up.'

Almost everything indicates that we will continue on our course and slither into disaster. But I'd also like to say that as long as there is a slight chance in matters of life, let's say a chance of one or two per cent, we must not give up. Until then we must try everything to avert disaster.

Because when you trade in *life it is* different than when you trade in money. If you wanted to invest money and your chances of not losing it were only o[...] or two per cent you'd be a fool [...] invest. If a man is critically ill and t[...] is a one or two per cent chance [...] saving his life medicine will do eve[...] thing in its power to save it. And so [...] issues ultimately involve the life o[...] mankind.

I believe that we all know much mo[...] than we realise. We are using a gre[...] portion of our energy to suppress the [...] truth. We are running away from ou[...] selves. Our dreams are the best pro[...] There I differ from Freud, who said th[...] *dreams were always the* wish fulfillme[...] of relatively primitive, essentially sexu[...] desires. But dreams that convey realis[...] tions that don't fit conscious patter[...] are equally frequent if not more so.

Q: Does the danger of collective su[...] pression also have to do with the dange[...] of fascism?

A: Yes. A prime example of collecti[...] suppression was the Hitler era. I hav[...] collected much proof that most Ge[...] *mans tell the truth when they* say th[...] didn't know about the murder of Je[...] and Poles and Communists ordered b[...] Hitler. You'll say that is impossible; th[...] people had to know.


But mostly they did not know and when they say so they are being honest. But we must go a step further. The[...] could have known from many signs; bu[...] they suppressed their knowledge. Th[...] explains how it was possible for Hitle[...] to do such things.

If the German people had know[...] about them — there can be no doubt [...] Hitler would not have been able to sta[...] in power. Most of the German people [...] would have been revolted by this sadis[...] and immorality, and so Hitler had to d[...] all he could to keep it secret from the [...] people. (Die Zeit, 21 March 1980)

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■ SPORT

Sicilian and Grünfeld tactics in stony silence



A visitor to Bad Lauterberg, the Harz spa, who was taking the waters for his health's sake, had heard that a Hun*garian and a German were playing chess* in a conference room at his hotel.

It was, he understood, a world championship quarter-final game, so he decided to go along. The sight of two giants of the chessboard pitting their wits against each other was unlikely to upset his frail health.

So off he went, blissfully unaware of chess theory and tactics. He just thought he'd have a look. But on three separate occasions he wasn't allowed into the room, he complained.

This wasn't strictly true. He could have got in by paying a small fee, had he but known. But he would hardly have thought it worth the money.

Yet for a layman this mercenary *demand might just have been warranted.* It was an unusual event that was surely worth a few marks to see at first hand.

But as it happened, chess buffs must have felt gravely disappointed. For them what they paid to see the opening of the second game between Andras Adorjan and Robert Hübner can hardly have been felt to be worth the outlay.

For their hard-earned cash all they were to see were 19 moves, 18 of which were *textbook moves too.*

Not, of course, that anyone would expect chess grand masters to face the public and say: "Ladies and gentlemen, the game we are about to play will start with a well-known opening. Please open your textbooks at the Spanish opening, open variation. And this is how it goes."

A grand master will naturally never dream of doing any such thing. Even though the next move may be a foregone conclusion he *will do his best* to look inscrutable and possibly about to resort to a stroke of genius.

If he happens to be Robert Hübner, the Bavarian grand master, he may well stretch his hands above his head, breathe deeply and cross them behind his *cranium, a gesture registered respect*fully by the audience.

Should the other player look as though he is deep in thought (whereas in reality he is merely killing time wondering how long he ought to take before making the move that is the foregone conclusion), he will pace grandly up and down in his half of the room.

As he does so he will either look into the middle distance or gaze engrossedly at the floor, maybe stopping off at the drinks table with its array of mineral water and fruit juice.

Alcohol would naturally spell the death of the aforementioned strokes of genius that are the very least chess buffs might expect to see at a world championship game.

It is all done with malice aforethought. The hotel is pleasant, the expenses paid for. You can hardly blame players for not wanting to rush through the game at breakneck speed merely for the sake of a quick win.

The Hungarian delegation includes a psychologist — virtually *de rigueur* since Korchnoi complained in 1978 that his powers of concentration had been upset by a hypnotist in the world championship final against Karpov.

Hübner's only aide *is* Sigurjonsson, the Icelandic grand master, but for a loner of his calibre that in itself is a substantial concession to the need for companionship.

The Bavarian grand master is the clear favourite at Bad Lauterberg. When lots were *drawn in* Amsterdam he was fortunate enough to draw the player generally rated the poorest of the eight quarter-finalists.

Adorjan, *30 this year, is two years* younger than Hübner, who needs only to win one game (and he did win the third) provided all the others are drawn (which should not prove too difficult for a player of his calibre and experience).

The small print of the rules was only sttled just before the session began, however, after the president of FIE, the World Chess Federation, had created a flurry at Wörthersee in Austria where Korchnoi and Petrosian were due to play another quarter-final bout.

Their bout was to be open-ended, he ruled, meaning there was to be no limit to the number of games to be played, no tie break, no penalty decider, no thoss of the coin. It was to be a fight to *the death.*

The Dutch umpire at Bad Lauterberg was anxious to get home at some time in the foreseeable future, so he at least was relieved to hear that Adorjan and Hübner were to play only 10 games.

There would then be four more games at the most, with a higher value attached to games won by black, and if the two men were still level-pegging lots would then be drawn to decide the outcome.

In the conference hall you can hear a pin drop. Words are exchanged only in the corridor, where a demonstration board has been set up to show the progress of the game in an area partitioned off from the rest of the hotel.

Chief coach Samarian analyses the game, interrupted by the musings of his audience. They, like all advanced students of chess, are only really interested in the wilder and more esoteric variations; obvious moves are boring and beneath their dignity to consider.

During the first two games most young disciples do not appear unduly impressed by the performance of the grand master. Both games are drawn, much to their disappointment (although *with all due respect).*

In the first game Adorjan, playing with black, adopted a Grünfeld defence. The game was declared a draw after 28 moves. As though this was a towering intellectual achievement the two players thereupon rested for two days.

The second game did not even last 28 moves before they agreed to a draw, but the third, with a Sicilian opening, proved more interesting.

The opening, coach Samarian explained, was reminiscent of a 1978 game between Geller and a Soviet player with an unpronounceable name. Hübner chose not to leave this beaten track until the twentieth move.

The middle game was like the opening. Hübner, *playing with white, made* the running. It proved not to the Hungarian player's liking, especially as his time ran short towards the end.

In the end the final moves were almost as impressive as the wilder flights of fancy among spectators in the corridor outside.


Hübner won a resounding victory but proved a sensitive winner. As the applause echoed round a room in which *absolute quiet had prevailed he put his* fingers to his ears to deaden the noise.

Roswin Finkenzeller

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 22 March 1980)



Robert Hübner (left) in passive action, in this case against Russia's Karpov.
(Photo: Greiser)



(Cartoon: Liebermann/Süddeutsche Zeitung)